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Partial-Birth Abortion: Should Moral Judgment
Prevail Over Medical Judgment?
I. INTRODUCTION
Never, since the final shot of the Civil War, over a century and a
quarter ago, has American society been faced with an issue so polar-
izing and, at the same time, so totally incapable of either rational dis-
cussion or compromise, as is the ongoing controversy ... over the le-
gality of attempts by the State to regulate abortion-the act of
voluntarily terminating a pregnancy, prior to full term.
1
Abortion is a difficult topic to discuss without quickly entering into a
debate over morality. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that abortion is a constitutionally protected privacy right under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 While abortion is a
fundamental right, it is not an unqualified right.3 In 1992, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,4 the Court affirmed the central holdings of Roe v.
Wade,5 but established the "undue burden" standard for determining
1. Women's Med. Prof'1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1056 (S.D. Ohio 1995),
aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). This was the first court
in the United States to decide the constitutionality of a state partial-birth abortion ban. The court
granted an abortion clinic and a doctor's motion for a preliminary injunction, thereby preventing
Ohio from enforcing a state law attempting to regulate abortions. See id. at 1094.
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (concluding that the fight of personal pri-
vacy includes the decision to have an abortion, but the right must be considered against important
state interests in its regulation). The Court found the right of privacy applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (up-
holding the essential holding of Roe); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
3. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (holding that there are competing interests that must be evalu-
ated when restricting abortion); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S.
968, 972 (1997) (upholding a state requirement that abortions be performed by licensed physi-
cians); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 519 (1983) (holding that states may require all sec-
ond-trimester abortions to be performed in a licensed clinic), overruled in part by Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979)
(upholding parental consent requirement for minors seeking abortion if a judicial override exists).
4. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (determining the constitutionality of
five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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whether a state restriction on abortion unconstitutionally infringed upon
the right to abortion. 6 Although the Court in Casey secured a woman's
right to an abortion, the holding opened the door to a host of new issues
concerning the balance between the woman's right and the state's
recognized interests.
The current focus of abortion debates is on a method of abortion
called "partial-birth" abortion. Although not a medical term, this
phrase is generally understood to refer to the dilation and extraction
("D&X") method of late-term abortion. 7  The procedure involves
aborting a fetus after it has been partially delivered.8 On January 14,
2000, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the contradictory
federal circuit court holdings on the constitutionality of partial-birth
abortion bans.9 In October 1999, the Seventh Circuit decided that the
Illinois and Wisconsin statutes banning the D&X procedure do not
create an undue burden on a woman's right to choose abortion.
10
6. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. According to Casey, a statute constitutes an undue burden
when the "regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." id. at 877.
7. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1145
(8th Cir. 1999) (noting "this term, though widely used by lawmakers and in the popular press, has
no fixed medical or legal content"), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000); Lee Ann Lezzer, Rich-
mond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore: Virginia Partial-Birth Abortion Act's Clarity Ex-
tinguishes Physician Standing, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 351, 356 (1999); Ann MacLean
Massie, So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortion" Bans: Bad Medicine? Maybe. Bad Law? Defi-
nitely!, 59 U. PITt. L. REv. 301, 302 (1998); Rebecca L. Andrews, Note, The Unconstitutionality
of State Legislation Banning "Partial-Birth" Abortion, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 521, 521 n. I (1999);
Margo L. Ely, Ruling Deals Blow to Anti-Abortion Forces, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 11, 1998,
at 6; ACLU, Stop Congress from Criminalizing Safe Abortion Procedures! (visited March 17,
2000) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/reproduct/feature.html> [hereinafter Stop Congress from
Criminalizing Safe Abortion Procedures]; see also infra Parts II.A.3 (describing the dilation and
extraction procedure); I.A (discussing other abortion methods).
8. See Testimony of Dr. Curtis R. Cook, M.D., 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 65, 66 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Cook] (defining partial-birth abortion as "the feet first delivery of a living infant up to the
level of its after coming head .... ").
9. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000) (granting certiorari to determine the consti-
tutionality of prohibitions on partial-birth abortions). The Eighth and Sixth Circuits have found
the partial-birth abortion statutes at issue unconstitutional. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195
F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding in all three cases that the partial-birth abortion bans were
unconstitutional); Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1146; Little Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley,
192 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1999); Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 200
(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). Conversely, the Seventh Circuit held that the
partial-birth abortion statutes of Illinois and Wisconsin could be applied constitutionally. See
Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 861.
10. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 874-75 (applying the standard set forth in Casey, which held
that states can regulate abortion as long as regulation is not a "substantial obstacle" that prevents
a woman from choosing abortion).
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Although three other federal circuits had addressed various state partial-
birth abortion bans," I the Seventh Circuit was the first to uphold the
constitutionality of such bans. 12 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits did not
reach the issue of whether a prohibition of the D&X procedure was
constitutional because they first concluded that the state bans were so
broad as to prohibit other abortion methods. 13 By deciding that issue
first, the courts concluded that the statutes were unconstitutional under
Casey because they created an undue burden on a women's right to an
abortion. 14  Thus, the courts did not have the opportunity to reach the
issue of whether a ban of D&X, in particular, was an undue burden. 15
This Comment first discusses the several methods of abortion
currently used in the United States 16 and the historical development of
abortion law in this country.' 7 Next, this Comment outlines the split in
the federal circuit court holdings, 18 specifically exploring the differing
rationale between the circuits that found the state laws prohibiting
partial-birth abortion laws unconstitutional' 9 and those that upheld
similar statutes.20  This Comment then explains why specifically
prohibiting the D&X procedure is an undue burden to women seeking
abortions 21 and why state legislatures should not enact such statutes. 22
Finally, this Comment proposes that the Supreme Court should hold that
11. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 388; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1146; Jegley, 192 F.3d at 798; Rich-
mond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd by panel on reh'g,
144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998); Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 198.
12. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 861.
13. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1146 n.4. The court stated: "it [is not] necessary for us to discuss
•.. whether the law creates an undue burden by prohibiting the D&X procedure. The basis for
our holding is the undue burden created by the ban of the D&E procedure." Id.; see also Miller,
195 F.3d at 388 ("Other abortion procedures would be prohibited as well [under the Iowa Act],
however, and this is the problem."); Jegley, 192 F.3d at 798 ("Because both the D&E procedure
and the suction-curettage procedure used in second-trimester abortions often include what the Act
prohibits, physicians performing those procedures will violate the Act"); Voinovich, 130 F.3d at
198 (stating that "the Act's definition of the banned procedure encompasses the D&E proce-
dure").
14. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 388; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150-51; Jegley, 192 F.3d at 798; Voi-
novich, 130 F.3d at 198.
15. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 388; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150-51; Jegley, 192 F.3d at 798; Voi-
novich, 130 F.3d at 198.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Parts II.B-E.
18. See infra Parts IlA-B.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part II1.B.
21. See infra Part IV.A
22. See infra Part IV.B.
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the bans on the D&X procedure are unconstitutional because of the
undue burdens they create on a woman's choice to have an abortion. 23
II. BACKGROUND
The current abortion debate focus on the conflict between the roles of
the medical and legal communities in regulating abortion techniques.
Although "[t]he constitutional right to an abortion carries with it the
right to perform medical procedures that many people find distasteful or
worse," the medical procedure may be regulated by either the medical
or the legal communities, or both.24 After explaining the common
medical procedures for performing an abortion, 25 this section will
explain the development of the legal background regarding abortion and
the current debate. 26
A. Medical Background
The particular abortion method employed by a physician depends
upon the stage of the pregnancy as well as doctor and patient
preferences. 27 A pregnancy typically lasts nine months, and its duration
is determined by the number of weeks since the first day of the
woman's last menstrual period ("LMP").28 The nine months of
pregnancy are divided up into trimesters of roughly equal duration.29
The third trimester is usually defined at the point of viability ,30 which
23. See infra Part V.
24. Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated sub nom. Hope
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan.
10, 2000) (No. 99-1156).
25. See infra Part II.A (discussing the several methods of abortion currently being used).
26. See infra Part lI.B (discussing the development of abortion law).
27. See WARREN M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 146-54 (1984).
28. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 800 n.5 (E.D. Va.
1998), rev'd, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), affd by panel on reh'g, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998);
ATTORNEY'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY P68 (1997) (stating that "a full-term preg-
nancy usually lasts 40 weeks").
29. "First Trimester" is "the first 14 weeks of gestation." "Second Trimester" is "from the
15th to the 28th week of gestation." "Third Trimester" is "from the 29th through the 42nd week
of gestation." ATTORNEY'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY T71 (1997); see also
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1855 (26th ed. 1995) (defining "trimester" as "[a] period of 3
months; one third of the length of a pregnancy.").
30. "Viability" means "the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992);
see also STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1936 (26th ed. 1995) (Viability "usually connotes a
fetus that has reached 500 g[rams] in weight and 20 gestational weeks."). A fetus is considered
"living" around ten weeks LMP when it has "sustained cardiac activity over a period of time at a
set rate." Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 801. "'[L]ife' in the fetus and viability are different con-
cepts." Id. Because of advances in medical technology, the point of viability occurs earlier than
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typically occurs between twenty-three and twenty-five weeks LMP.31
While over eighty-nine percent of abortions occur during the first
trimester, six percent occur between thirteen to fifteen weeks LMP, and
four percent occur from sixteen to twenty weeks. 32 Approximately 1.5
percent of all abortions occur after twenty weeks LMP.33 Descriptions
of abortion methods used in the United States follow.
1. Suction Curettage
The most common first trimester method of abortion is suction
curettage or vacuum aspiration.34 Doctors may use this method through
thirteen weeks LMP.35 Suction curettage can be done on an outpatient
basis in a clinic or physician's office. 36 The doctor may choose either
general or local anesthesia for this procedure. 37  After dilating the
cervix, 38 the doctor uses a tube attached to a vacuum generator to
it did at the time of Roe v. Wade. The survival rates of prematurely born infants increase as the
births reach the national medical standard for viability of twenty-five weeks LMP. See Roy
Rivenburg, In the PR War Over a Form of Late-Term Abortions, Both Sides Are Guilty of Ma-
nipulating the Facts. Here's What They Are (and Aren't) Saying, L.A. TIMES, April 2, 1997, at E-
l.
31. See Gilmore, II F. Supp. 2d at 801. At 23 weeks LMP, 25% survive at least 30 days. At
25 weeks, 40% live, "but many suffer severe disabilities, usually cerebral palsy, chronic lung
problems or blindness." Rivenburg, supra note 29, at E- 1.
32. See Massie, supra note 7, at 318-19 (citing statistics from 1992 survey by the Alan Gutt-
macher Institute).
33. See Planned Parenthood Fact Sheet: Abortion After the First Trimester (updated January
2000) <http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/facts/abortaftlst_010600.html> [hereinafter
Abortion After the First Trimester].
34. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 801. Another alternative during the first few weeks of
pregnancy is to administer certain drugs that induce a "medical abortion," but doctors choose this
option for only about 1% of women. See id.; see also Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 861
(7th Cir. 1999) (noting the use of methotrexate and RU 486 in early pregnancy in clinical trials),
petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156); Ely, supra note 6, at
6 (noting that abortion by agents such as RU 486 and methotrexate are not yet available in
America).
35. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 801; see also Little Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v.
Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 796 (8th Cit. 1999) (holding that Arkansas' Partial-Birth Abortion Act is
unconstitutional because it is too broad and unduly burdensome on women's rights). The ad-
vanced development of the fetus after 13 weeks LMP prevents the doctor from completely re-
moving the fetus by this procedure alone. See HERN, supra note 27, at 146-47; Comment, Con-
stitutional Law-Abortion-Sixth Circuit Strikes Down Ohio Ban of Post-Viability and Dilation and
Extraction Abortions-Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 112 HARV. L. REV.
731, 732 (1999) (citing Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 201 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998)).
36. See HERN, supra note 27, at 102.
37. See id. at 119-20 (suggesting the benefits of local anesthesia outweigh the increased risks
associated with general anesthesia).
38. There are several methods for dilating the cervix. See id. at 108-11, 117-19 (preferring the
use of laminaria, a seaweed based substance, over manual dilation); Martin Haskell, M.D., Dila-
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remove the "products of conception" from the uterus.3 9  Major
complications from suction curettage are rare.
40
2. Dilation and Evacuation
During the second trimester, the most common abortion procedure is
dilation and evacuation ("D&E"). 41  This can also be done on an
outpatient basis and under local anesthesia.4 2 After dilating the
cervix, 43 the doctor uses forceps to dismember the fetus while it is in the
uterus. 44 A vacuum then removes the pieces of fetal tissue from the
uterus. 45  Often, the doctor must reduce the size of the fetus' skull
because it is too large to pass through the cervix without injuring the
woman. 46 This is done by either crushing the skull or by using suction
to remove the intercranial contents. 47  Complications associated with
D&E are more likely to occur during the procedure, as opposed to the
delayed complications that are associated with suction curettage.
48
tion and Extraction for Late Second Trimester Abortion, reprinted in 139 CONG. REC. E1092
(daily ed. April 29, 1993) (describing use of Dilapan to dilate the cervix). Dilation by Dilapan
and laminaria may take two to three days. See HERN, supra note 26, at 108-11 (noting overnight
use of laminaria may be seen as a disadvantage); Haskell, supra, at E1092.
39. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 801; Andrews, supra note 6, at 526-27 (citing JOHNATHAN
B. IMBER, ABORTION AND THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 58 (1986)). Sometimes the
procedure requires use of a curette to scrape the uterus and separate the embryo or fetus from the
placenta. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 861.
40. See HERN, supra note 27, at 176-87 (discussing complications which include postabortal
syndrome, infection, and perforation).
41. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 198 (6th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998).
42. See HERN, supra note 27, at 132-33.
43. See id. at 126 ("One of the principal controversies among advocates of the D&E method is
the manner of cervical dilation"); see also supra note 38 (describing various methods of dilation).
44. See HERN, supra note 27, at 139; Haskell, supra note 38, at E1092.
45. See HERN, supra note 27, at 129; see also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore,
144 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd by panel on reh'g, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998). "Be-
cause the fetus is larger ... and because bones are more rigid ... some physicians use intrafetal
potassium chloride or digoxim to induce fetal demise prior to a late D&E (after 20 weeks), to fa-
cilitate evacuation." Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1147 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting AMA
report), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000); see also HERN, supra note 27, at 144-46. But see
Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 201 n.12 (noting that typically physicians will use induction during the
later second trimester instead of the D&E procedure because of the difficulty caused by the
toughness of fetal tissue).
46. See HERN, supra note 27, at 194-95, 199-200; see also Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1066;
Ely, supra note 7, at 6; Rivenburg, supra note 30, at E-1.
47. See HERN, supra note 27, at 194-95, 199-200; see also Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1066;
Ely, supra note 7, at 6.
48. See HERN, supra note 27, at 194-204.
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3. Dilation and Extraction
The controversial alternative to the D&E procedure has several
names: dilation and extraction ("D&X"),49 intact dilation and
evacuation ("intact D&E"), 50 and intact dilation and extraction ("intact
D&X"). 51 This procedure can be performed on patients twenty to
twenty-four weeks LMP and on selected patients from twenty-five to
twenty-six weeks LMP.52  It has also been performed up to thirty-two
weeks or more.53  D&X presents some physical benefits, such as less
potential blood loss and less risk of lacerations or infection. 54  The
procedure also has psychological benefits, such as seeing and holding
an intact fetus. 55
Dr. Martin Haskell of Ohio, the first physician to call this procedure
"dilation and extraction," provided a description of the D&X procedure
to the National Abortion Federation in 1992.56 Like suction curettage
and D&E, D&X can be performed on an outpatient basis with local
anesthesia.57 After dilating the woman's cervix,5 8 the doctor uses
forceps to locate the lower extremities of the fetus, such as a foot or
leg.59 The doctor then uses his fingers to deliver the body of the fetus,
49. This was the term used by Dr. Martin Haskell of Ohio in 1992 to distinguish the procedure
from "dismemberment-type D&E's." See Haskell, supra note 38, at E1092.
50. This was the term used by the late Dr. McMahon of California in 1989. See Cook, supra
note 8, at 66. "The procedure called 'partial birth abortion' . . . is medically known as intact dila-
tion and extraction." Helen Dewar, AMA Backs Late-Term Abortion Curb, WASH. POST, May
20, 1997, at Al.
51. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG") committee uses this
hybrid term. See Cook, supra note 8, at 66. The ACOG recognizes four distinct elements of the
D&X procedure:
1. deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days; 2. instrumental
conversion of the fetus to a footling breech; 3. breech extraction of the body excepting
the head; 4. partial evacuation of the intercranial contents of a living fetus to effect
vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus.
ACOG Statement of Policy, reprinted in 145 CONG. REC. S 12954 (1999).
52. See Haskell, supra note 38, at E1092.
53. See id. (referring to another doctor's practices). Some doctors believe this procedure is
particularly useful during the later part of the second trimester because as the fetal tissue becomes
more developed, D&E is more difficult. See id.
54. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of D&X). But see in-
fra notes 260-63 and accompanying text (discussing the risks of D&X).
55. See Massie, supra note 7, at 316-17.
56. See id. at 313 n.43. The doctor's description is found in a paper he submitted to the Na-
tional Abortion Federation in 1992. See id.
57. See HERN, supra note 27, at 312-13; Haskell, supra note 38 at E1092; see also supra notes
36, 42 and accompanying text (stating that suction curettage and D&E procedures can be per-
formed on an outpatient basis with local anesthesia).
58. See supra note 38 (discussing various methods for dilating the cervix).
59. See Haskell, supra note 38, at E1093.
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except the head, into the vagina.60 The cervix is not usually dilated
enough for the head to pass through without injuring the woman.61  The
doctor must then reduce the size of the head in order to complete the
abortion, as may occur in D&E abortions.62  In his paper, Dr. Haskell
described the fetal head reduction procedure, which requires the use of
scissors to make an incision in the base of the skull so that a suction
catheter can be used to evacuate the skull's contents. 63
4. Induction
Abortions by the induction method account for five percent of all
procedures performed after the first trimester. 64  The induction
procedure is typically used late second-term but is feasible any time
after fifteen weeks LMP. 65 In the most common induction, the
physician injects the uterus with a substance that both kills the fetus and
induces labor. 66 In the less common procedure, the substance used will
only induce labor; the resulting contractions actually kill the fetus.67
Because this procedure is similar to labor during a full-term delivery, it
involves the same complications, such as "mild to severe abdominal
pain," fear, and "lack of control. 68
60. See id. The term "delivered," in its medical sense, applies to "anything that is removed
from the uterus, which includes a baby, an intact fetus, a fetal part, or the placenta or umbilical
cord." Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 814 (E.D. Va. 1998),
rev'd, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd by panel on reh'g, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998);
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 453 (26th ed. 1995) (stating that "deliver" means "[t]o ex-
tract from an enclosed place, as the fetus from the womb"); see also Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195
F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No.
99-1156); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1306 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
61. See Haskell, supra note 38, at E1093; see also Massie, supra note 7, at 315 (stating that
the dangers include "hemorrhage or tearing of the woman's membranes").
62. See Haskell, supra note 38, at E1093; supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the need to reduce the size of the fetus' skull in D&E abortions).
63. See Haskell, supra note 38, at E1093.
64. See Ely, supra note 7, at 6.
65. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (stating that induction is an alternative to D&E).
66. See HERN, supra note 27, at 124-26; see also Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463,
467 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing district court's denial of temporary injunction against enforcement
of Wisconsin's partial-birth abortion laws), vacated sub nom. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857
(7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.W.L. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156);
Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (discussing the induction method).
67. See Doyle, 162 F.3d at 467 (citing WARREN M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 122-60
(1984)); Mokhtar Toppozada, Terminations of Pregnancy After 14 Weeks, in MODERN METHODS
OF INDUCING ABORTION 70 (David T. Baird et al. eds., 1995); see also HERN, supra note 27, at
123-24 (describing "mechanical stimulation" as a method for induction). These procedures may
unintentionally result in a live birth in a few cases. See Doyle, 162 F.3d at 467; HERN, supra note
27, at 124.
68. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1068 (S.D. Ohio 1995),
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5. Hysterotomy and Hysterectomy
The final two abortion procedures are the hysterotomy and
hysterectomy. These procedures, however, are rarely used.69  The
hysterotomy is essentially a pre-term caesarian section. 70  The
hysterectomy is the removal of the woman's entire uterus, which leaves
her sterile.71
B. First Abortion Cases: Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
Nationwide bans on abortion came under attack during the 1960s.72
Because of the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of illegal abortion
providers, women seeking illegal abortions suffered grave health risks,
including death. 73 Doctors, legal reformers, clergy and women united
to urge state legislators and courts to legalize abortion in order to reduce
the risks associated with abortion.74
In the landmark abortion law decision Roe v. Wade, the Supreme
Court determined that a woman's choice to have an abortion is a
fundamental right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's implicit
right to privacy. 75  The plaintiffs, a pregnant single woman, a childless
couple, and a physician, challenged a Texas law that prohibited all
abortions except when necessary to save the life of the mother. 76  The
aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998); see also Gilmore, II F.
Supp. 2d at 803; HERN, supra note 27, at 187-94 (discussing drawbacks of induction procedure);
Massie, supra note 7, at 316-17 (discussing benefits of D&X over induction); Ely, supra note 7,
at 6; infra notes 271-76 and accompanying text (outlining risks of induction).
69. See HERN, supra note 27, at 123 ("Hysterotomy has been almost completely abandoned
because of its associated high morbidity"); Massie, supra note 7, at 316 (stating that doctors
avoid hysterotomy because of its "attendant surgical risks").
70. "Caesarian section" is defined as an "incision through the abdominal wall and the uterus
(abdominal hysterotomy) for extraction of the fetus." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1589
(26th ed. 1995).
71. See Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 803. "Sterility" is defined as "the incapability of fertiliza-
tion or reproduction." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1675 (26th ed. 1995)
72. See ACLU, The Right to Choose at 25: Looking Back and Ahead (visited Nov. 27, 1999)
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/reproduct/rrujan98.html> (stating "finally in the 1960's, an outcry
arose to make abortion legal again").
73. See id. (stating that "[t]he unsafe and unsanitary practice of illegal abortion maimed and
killed thousands of women").
74. See id.
75. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-155 (1973). The Court previously found that several
of the guarantees within the Bill of Rights create related "zone[s] of privacy." See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that a married couple's right to use contracep-
tives fell in this "zone of privacy").
76. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18, 120-21. In Roe, a single pregnant woman instituted a class
action challenging the Texas criminal abortion statutes. See id. at 120-22. "The Texas statutes
under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a
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Court held that the right to privacy limits how state legislatures could
regulate the availability of abortions and abortion procedures. 77  In so
doing, the Court divided the typical duration of a pregnancy into
trimesters of roughly three months each.78 The Court then compared
the competing interests of the state to a woman's right of privacy during
each trimester. 7
9
Under this framework, the Court concluded that during the first
trimester the state may not ban abortions altogether nor closely regulate
abortions because the decision of abortion is between the woman and
her doctor. 80  In the second trimester, regulations are permitted only if
they are "reasonably related" to the woman's health. 81 Total bans on
abortion, however, are not permitted at this stage. 82 The third trimester
typically marks the stage of pregnancy when the fetus becomes viable.83
The Court decided that complete bans on abortions after viability are
allowed.84 The Court, however, required that abortions must be
permissible, even during the third trimester, when necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother.85
Thus, Roe acknowledged that state regulations face steep hurdles to
outweigh a woman's fundamental right to abortion. 86  The Court
recognized a two-prong test that state regulations must meet to pass
century." Id. at 116.
77. See id. at 162-64.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 163. The state does not have an interest in protecting the health of the mother
during the first trimester because the mortality rate for full-term pregnancies is actually higher
than abortions at this stage in history. See id.
81. See id. The Court stated that:
Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifi-
cations of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person;
as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a
hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the li-
censing of the facility; and the like.
Id. The Court found that during the second trimester, abortions pose a greater risk to the mother's
health. See id. Thus, the state has an interest in protecting the mother's health. See id.
82. See id. The state has no interest in the protection of the fetus' life in the first two trimes-
ters. See id.
83. See id. at 163-64. Viability means the "fetus then presumably has the capability of mean-
ingful life outside the mother's womb." Id. The determination of viability is left up to the doc-
tor's evaluation. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 515-516 (1989) (up-
holding a statute requiring a doctor to perform certain tests for viability).
84. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. At viability, the state has a compelling interest in protecting
the fetus because the fetus can potentially survive independent of the mother. See id. at 163.
85. See id. at 164.
86. See id. at 155-56.
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muster under Roe.87  The Court required that the regulations: (1)
promote a compelling state interest protecting either the mother or the
viability of the fetus, and (2) be narrowly drawn to protect only that
interest. 88
The Supreme Court decided Doe v. Bolton89 concurrently with Roe.
In Bolton, the Court described the factors a doctor should consider in
determining when an abortion is appropriate. 90 The Court stated that
when a doctor considers the life and health of the mother, the doctor
may also evaluate various "emotional, psychological, [and] familial"
factors.
9 1
C. Narrowing the Holding of Roe v. Wade: Planned Parenthood
v. Casey
The complete holding of Roe remained intact until the Court decided
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.92 Although the Court in Casey retained
the "essential holding of Roe," it rejected the trimester framework. 93
The Court reasoned that the trimester approach is not necessary to
protect the woman's right and that the trimester approach undervalues
the state's interest in fetal life.94 The case addressed a Pennsylvania
statute that contained several requirements for a woman to meet before
she could have an abortion, including a twenty-four hour waiting period
between the time she received information about the abortion and the
abortion procedure. In addition, the statute required spousal notification
of intent to abort for married women. 95
87. See id. (recognizing this two-prong test applies when fundamental rights are involved).
88. See id. (citations omitted).
89. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (overturning a Georgia statute making abortion a
crime unless it fell under three delineated exceptions).
90. See id. at 192 (stating that "medical judgement may be exercised in the light of all fac-
tors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age").
91. Id.
92. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Ken-
nedy jointly wrote the plurality opinion. See id. at 843-911. Justices Stevens and Blackmun
wrote separate concurring decisions saying they would have upheld Roe entirely. See id. at 911-
22 (Stevens, J., concurring), 922-934 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia wrote separate dissenting opinions that Justices White and Thomas joined. See id.
at 944-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 979-1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 873. Roe held that women have a right to chose abortion before viability without
substantial interference by the state. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). It also held
that states can restrict abortions after viability as long as there is an exception for maternal life
and health. See id. at 163-64.
94. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
95. See id. at 844.
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In Casey, the Court redefined the state's interests to include
protecting not only the health of the mother but also the life of the fetus
from the beginning of the pregnancy. 96 The Court held that the state's
regulations must not impose an undue burden 97 on a woman's right to
choose an abortion. 98  Once the point of viability has been reached,
however, the Court held that the state can proscribe all abortions as long
as the laws provide exceptions for where the life or health of the mother
is at risk.99
D. Challenge of a State Ban on an Abortion Method:
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth1°° is the only case in which the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state law
prohibiting a specific abortion method. 101 In Danforth, the Court held
unconstitutional a Missouri law that forbade, inter alia, the use of the
saline amniocentesis 10 2 for the induction method of abortion after the
96. See id. at 876. These are competing interests that must be balanced. See id.
97. "Undue burden" is defined as a regulation that "has the purpose or effect of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 877.
This standard differs from the longstanding test for facial constitutional challenges before Casey
as found in United States v. Salerno. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating
that under a facial challenge, the challenger "must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid"). The Supreme Court has not decided the issue of whether
Casey overturned Salerno for abortion challenges, though courts and individual judges have
commented in majority or dissenting opinions. See Women's Med. Prof'I Corp. v. Voinovich,
130 F.3d 187, 193-96 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (holding that Salerno
does not apply to facial challenges to abortion regulations). But see id. at 217-219 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (leaving open the question of Salerno's applicability).
98. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. For example, the Court found the following Pennsylvania
laws are not an undue burden: informed consent with a 24 hour waiting period before the proce-
dure, parental consent for a minor under 18 as long as there is a judicial bypass provision, and
mandatory record keeping at abortion facilities. See id. at 881, 899-900. The Court found the
provision requiring spousal notification is an undue burden. See id. at 895.
99. See id. at 846.
100. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In Danforth, several physicians
challenged the constitutionality of the Missouri legislation, which, among other things, instituted
an informed consent policy, a definition of "viability," and prohibited the use of "saline amnio-
centesis" as a method of abortion. See id. at 56-59.
101. See Jill R. Radloff, Note, Partial-Birth Infanticide: An Alternate Legal and Medical
Route to Banning Partial-Birth Procedures, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1555, 1562 (1999) ("In its twenty-
six year history of abortion jurisprudence, the Supreme Court only once has considered the con-
stitutionality of banning a specific abortion procedure."). The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari to consider the constitutionality of partial-birth abortion laws. See Stenberg v. Carhart,
68 U.S.W.L. 3338 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-830), granting cert. in part to 192 F.3d 1142 (8th
Cir. 1999) (holding that ban on partial-birth abortion creates an undue burden on a woman's right
to have an abortion).
102. Saline anmiocentesis is an abortion procedure "whereby the amniotic fluid is withdrawn
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first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 1°3 The Court concluded that the law
was not a "reasonable regulation" that adequately supported the State's
interest in protecting the mother's health.'l 4
In reaching this decision, the Court considered the frequency of the
saline amniocentesis procedure during post-first-trimester abortions,10
5
the limited availability of only one alternative technique, 10 6 and the
increased risk to the health of the mother involved in the two remaining
alternatives. 10 7  The Court found that the law effectively banned a
procedure that doctors used in a "vast majority" of all second trimester
abortions in the United States.' 0 8  Put simply, the ban prohibited the
most common second trimester abortion procedure at that time. 10 9
Although Danforth was decided under the trimester framework of Roe,
the Court's holding was narrow enough to meet the undue burden
standard required under Casey."10
and 'a saline or other fluid' is inserted into the amniotic sac." Danforth, 428 U.S. at 76. This is
one way to induce labor under the induction method of abortion. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195
F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No.
99-1156); see also supra Part HI.A.4 (describing induction).
103. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75-76.
104. See id. at 79.
105. See id. at 77 (noting the testimony stated that nationwide use of saline amniocentesis
ranges from 68% to 80%).
106. One alternative accepted by the district court was the prostaglandin technique, which is
an alternative substance used to induce labor in an induction method abortion. See id. at 77. The
appellees did not offer any evidence that it was even available in Missouri, however, and the evi-
dence showed that no physicians in the neighboring state of Kentucky were "competent in the
technique of prostaglandin amnio infusion." Id. at 77 (quoting Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp.
631, 637 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
107. Hysterotomy and hysterectomy "are significantly more dangerous and critical for the
woman than the saline technique." Id. at 76. The court pointed out the "anomaly inherent in [the
statute] when it proscribes the use of saline but does not prohibit techniques that are many times
more likely to result in maternal death." Id. at 78. Thus, the court concluded the law was not a
reasonable regulation aimed at protecting maternal health, but rather an arbitrary one. See id. at
79.
108. See id. at 79.
109. See id.
110. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 201 (6th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). The court reasoned:
Although Roe's second trimester standard allowed for fewer constitutional abortion
regulations than does Casey's undue burden standard, it follows that a statute which
bans a common abortion procedure would constitute an undue burden. An abortion
regulation that inhibits the vast majority of second trimester abortions would clearly
have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-
viability abortion. Therefore, the Court's analysis in Danforth is consistent with Ca-
sey's undue burden standard and thus provides us with some guidance in this matter.
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E. Catalyst for Concern Over Partial-Birth Abortions
The D&X procedure has become the most recent abortion method to
receive national scrutiny. After the 1993 presentation to Congress of
Dr. Martin Haskell's paper, Dilation and Extraction for Late Second
Trimester Abortion,I l l nationwide concern over the D&X procedure
began to spread.' 1 2 Dr. Haskell's paper outlined the medical procedures
involved in D&X abortions. 113  The D&X procedure is commonly
referred to as "partial-birth abortion" although that term does not reflect
the medical definition of the procedure. 114 In addition, public reaction
to the D&X procedure may have been intensified because the only
benefit of D&X provided in Dr. Haskell's paper was that it can be
performed under local anesthesia on an outpatient basis. 1 5
III. DISCUSSION
As a result of the widespread knowledge of the details involved in the
D&X procedure, both the House and Senate twice passed a federal ban
111. See Haskell, supra note 38, at E1092-93. The paper is a detailed description of the tech-
nical medical terms of the procedure, and includes details such as the amount of local anesthesia
that should be administered and other medications administered. See id. The paper was pre-
sented at the National Abortion Federation Risk Management Seminar in 1992. See Voinovich,
130 F.3d at 198-99 n.8.
112. See Lezzer, supra note 7, at 356 (discussing the Virginia Partial-Birth Abortion Act);
Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Rule on Law that Bans Abortion Method, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2000, at Al; Rivenburg, supra note 30, at E-I (describing how the debate began once the Na-
tional Right to Life Committee discovered Dr. Haskell's paper); see also Massie, supra note 7, at
322-23 (discussing the introduction of the first federal partial-birth abortion legislation). Repre-
sentative Robert K. Doman of California introduced the paper to Congress to bolster opposition
to the Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 25. See 139 CONG. REC. E1092 (1993). Mr. Dornan stated
that if the Freedom of Choice Act passed "second and third trimester abortions on demand will be
perfectly legal." Id. The Freedom of Choice Act was proposed in response to Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey. See 138 CONG. REC. S9035 (1992). Codifying Roe v. Wade, it prohibits states
from placing undue restrictions on an individual's right to reproductive choice. See id.
113. See Haskell, supra note 38, at EI092-93.
114. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that the "legal defi-
nition is an imperfect match for the medical definition of D&X"), petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1145
(8th Cir. 1999) (indicating that "this term, though widely used by lawmakers and in the popular
press, has no fixed medical or legal content"), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000); Massie, supra
note 7, at 302 (asserting that the federal legislation uses "terminology that is virtually meaning-
less to the profession qualified to perform abortions"); Andrews, supra note 7, at 521 n. I (quoting
joint hearing before Senate Judiciary Committee).
115. See Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing district
court's denial of temporary injunction against enforcement of Wisconsin's partial-birth abortion
laws), vacated sub nom. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.W.L 3840 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000); see also Haskell, supra note 38, at E1093 ("Among
its advantages are that it is a quick, surgical outpatient method that can be performed on a sched-
uled basis under local anesthesia.").
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on partial-birth abortions for President Clinton to veto the law both
times. 116  Most recently, the Senate passed the 1999 version of the
ban117 on October 21, 1999,118 and it is currently pending approval by
the House. 19
State legislatures quickly responded to the outrage over D&X by
proposing bans on the procedure.' 20  At least thirty states passed bans
that use the non-medical term "partial-birth abortion" to describe the
D&X procedure. 121  Several states modeled their statutes after the
substantially identical 1997 federal bill. 122 Since 1997, twenty of these
state statutes have been challenged in both state and federal courts. 123
116. The President did not think the statute, as written, provided an adequate exception to
protect the life and health of women who may need the D&X procedure. See Massie, supra note
7, at 319-20; Radloff, supra note 101, at 1555 n.3.
117. The proposed "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1999" states "'partial-birth abortion'
means an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a liv-
ing fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery." S. 1692, 106th Cong.
§ 2(b)(1)(1999).
118. See 145 CONG. REC. S12997 (1999).
119. See Lezzer, supra note 7, at 356 (detailing federal legislative history).
120. See Radloff, supra note 101, at 1556 n.3 (stating that "only four state legislatures (Ne-
vada, North Dakota, Texas and Pennsylvania) have not introduced any partial-birth abortion ban
statute in the last three years"); Partial-Birth Abortion Laws (last modified Jan. 30, 2000)
<http://hometown.aol.com/abtrbng/pbal.htm> [hereinafter Partial-Birth Abortion Laws] (citing
the following state statutes: 1997 ALA. Act 97-485 (S.B. 314); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050
(LEXIS 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
61-203 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 390.011 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-144 (1999); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/10 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1 (West Supp. 1999); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (West Supp. 1999); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17016, 33.17516 (West Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-73
(West 1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (1999); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 28-326, 28-328 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-65A (West 1998); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (Anderson 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 24-4.12 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-41-85 (West Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-27 (LEXIS Supp. 1999); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (LEXIS 1999); VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.2-74.2 (1998)).
121. See Partial-Birth Abortion Laws, supra note 120. These states include Alabama. Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See Planned
Parenthood Fact Sheet: State Laws Restricting Access to Abortion (last modified Jan. 20, 1999)
<http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/ABORTION/StateLaws.html> (detailing status of
various state laws prohibiting partial-birth abortion) [hereinafter State Laws Restricting Access to
Abortion]. In Ohio, the statute prohibits "dilation and extraction," not "partial-birth abortion."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(B) (Anderson 1996).
122. See Radloff, supra note 101, at 1563 n.38 (listing twenty-five state laws that are similar
to the proposed federal statute).
123. See State Laws Restricting Access to Abortion, supra note 121; American Civil Liberties
Union, The State "Partial-Birth Abortion" Bans: Enjoined in the Courts (last modified Jan. 28,
1999) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/reproduct/statepbbans.html> [hereinafter Enjoined in the
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As a result of this litigation, courts in eighteen states either permanently
or temporarily enjoined the statutory D&X bans. 124  The Federal Courts
of Appeals in three circuits ruled on the laws of six states: Ohio,
Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas, Illinois, and Wisconsin. 125 The Eighth and
Sixth Circuits found that the partial-birth abortion bans they reviewed
were unconstitutional. 126  On October 26, 1999, the Seventh Circuit
departed from those circuits when it held that Illinois' and Wisconsin's
partial-birth abortion bans were constitutional. 127  Although the Fourth
Circuit has yet to rule on the merits of Virginia's partial-birth abortion
statute, it granted a stay of the district court's injunction on enforcing
the statute.'1 2
8
Courts].
124. See Radloff, supra note 101, at 1565 n.49; State Laws Restricting Access to Abortion,
supra note 121; Enjoined in the Courts, supra note 123 (listing the following cases: Hope Clinic
v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing permanent injunction of Illinois law and pre-
liminary injunction of Wisconsin law); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir.
1999) (permanently enjoined); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 865 (2000) (permanently enjoined); Little Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley,
192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999) (permanently enjoined); Women's Med. Prof'I Corp. v. Voinovich,
130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), aff'g 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1036 (1998) (permanently enjoined); A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (permanently enjoined); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 42 F. Supp. 2d 604
(E.D. La. 1999) (preliminary injunction granted); Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d
478 (D. N.J. 1998) (permanent injunction granted); Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d
1360 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (preliminary injunction granted); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024
(W.D. Ky. 1998) (permanent injunction granted); Brancazio v. Underwood, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22420 (D.W. Va. 1998) (temporary restraining order granted); Weyhrich v. Lance, No.
Civ. 98-CV- I 17-S-BLW (D. Idaho 1998) (temporary restraining order granted); Intermountain
Planned Parenthood v. State, No. BDV 97-477 (D.C. Mont. 1998); Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v.
Pine, No. 97-416L (D.R.I. 1998) (temporary restraining order granted); Planned Parenthood v.
Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997) (permanently enjoined); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp.
1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (permanently enjoined); Planned Parenthood v. State, No. 3AN-97-6019
(Super. Ct. Alaska 1998) (permanently enjoined)).
125. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding the constitution-
ality of the Illinois and Wisconsin partial-birth abortion statutes), petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3840 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 387 (8th Cir.
1999) (holding Iowa's partial-birth abortion statute unconstitutional); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192
F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding Nebraska partial-birth abortion statute unconstitutional
and permanently enjoining its enforcement), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000); Little Rock
Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding unconstitu-
tional the Arkansas partial-birth abortion statute as over broad and unduly burdensome);
Women's Med. Prof'1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming the dis-
trict court's grant of a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of the Ohio partial-birth abor-
tion statute), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998).
126. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 387; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1145; Jegley, 192 F.3d at 795; Voino-
vich, 130 F.3d at 190.
127. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 861.
128. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1998) (de-
nying the motion to vacate the stay of the district court order), aff'd by panel on reh'g, 183 F.3d
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A. Circuits Holding Partial-Birth Abortion Bans Are Unconstitutional
1. Sixth Circuit Decision
In Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 129 the Sixth
Circuit became the first Federal Court of Appeals to review the
constitutionality of a partial-birth abortion ban. 130  It affirmed the
district court's holding that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional. 131 The
statute created two separate bans: one of the D&X 132 procedure entirely
and the second of any type of abortion procedure when the "unborn
human is viable."'133  The plaintiffs claimed the statute is
unconstitutional because it "impose[s] undue burdens on a woman's
right to choose an abortion or ... jeopardize[s] the pregnant woman's
health," and was unconstitutionally vague.
134
Because this was a facial challenge of the constitutionality of a
statute, the court applied the undue burden standard of review set forth
in Casey.135 The court determined that the definition of the prohibited
procedure is broad and could also apply to other methods of abortion,
303 (4th Cir. 1998). This is the only jurisdiction in which the district court found the state ban
unconstitutional, yet the court of appeals allowed the ban to remain in effect until further review.
See Enjoined in the Courts, supra note 123.
129. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). In Voinovich, an abortion clinic and doctor filed suit against the
Governor of Ohio, Attorney General of Ohio, and a State's Attorney, seeking to enjoin enforce-
ment of an Ohio law prohibiting dilation and extraction method abortions. See id. at 191-92. The
district court entered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the statute. See Women's
Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1092-94 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aftd, 130 F.3d
187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). The Sixth Circuit affirmed this grant of
injunction on appeal. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 190.
130. Ohio's early involvement in banning partial-birth abortions and challenging the bans is
not surprising because "Dr. Haskell, the originator of the D&X procedure, is from Ohio."
Radloff, supra note 101, at 1563 n.40. The Ohio statute involved specifically bans the "dilation
and extraction" procedure. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2919.15(B) (Anderson 1996).
131. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 190.
132. D&X is defined in the statute as "[tihe termination of a human pregnancy by purposely
inserting a suction device into the skull of a fetus to remove the brain. 'Dilation and extraction
procedure' does not include either the suction curettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspi-
ration procedure of abortion." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A).
133. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 190 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A)). The analysis
of the post-viability ban focuses on the adequacy of the medical necessity or medical emergency
exceptions and the lack of scienter requirement. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A).
134. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 192.
135. See id. at 195-96. The standard in Casey is if "in a large fraction of the cases in which
[the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion," the statute is unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895
(1992). The court acknowledged the split in the Supreme Court over the actual effect of the Ca-
sey decision on the previous standard of review for facial challenges to constitutionality as estab-
lished in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 195.
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such as the D&E procedure. 136 Thus, the court found that the Ohio law
creates an undue burden because it prohibits D&E, the most common
abortion procedure used during the second trimester.' 37  The court
found the second part of the Ohio law, which banned all post-viability
abortions, permissible under Casey because a state can proscribe all
post-viability abortions, as long as there are exceptions to protect
maternal life and health. 138 The court, however, concluded that
according to Ohio law, this part of the statute is not severable from the
unconstitutional portion. 139
The dissenting opinion in Voinovich argued that the state legislature
acted within the scope of its power in regulating the D&X procedure. 140
First, the dissent considered the holding of Danforth in light of the
undue burden standard set forth in Casey.141 The dissent argued that
without a finding that other procedures are unsafe or unavailable, it is
not enough that the procedure may be less risky to constitute an undue
burden on the right to an abortion. 142  Second, the dissent stated that the
statute's definition of the D&X procedure was not so broad as to
prohibit the D&E procedure, 143  arguing that the Ohio legislature's
intent to ban only one procedure was clearly communicated through
sufficiently exact words. 144
2. Eighth Circuit Decision
In September, 1999, the Eighth Circuit, by unanimous vote, found
three similarly written partial-birth abortion bans unconstitutional
136. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200. Doctors testified before the district court that often
when performing the D&E procedure, the doctor must reduce the size of the fetus' head in order
to complete the abortion. See id. at 198. Although doctors develop different methods to do this,
"some physicians compress the head by using suction to remove the intercranial contents." Id.
The court concluded that this makes the statutory definition for D&X applicable to some D&E
procedures because the use of suction occurs "purposely." See id. at 200.
137. See id. at 201.
138. See id. at 202.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 213 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
141. See id. (Boggs, J., dissenting).
142. See id. (Boggs, J., dissenting). The district court compared the risks of D&X to'D&E,
induction, hysterectomy, and hysterotomy. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F.
Supp. 1051, 1067-70 (S.D. Ohio 1995), affd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1036 (1998). It concluded that D&X "appears to have the potential of being a safer procedure
than all other available abortion procedures." Id. at 1070.
143. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 214-15 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 215 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe D&E procedure does not satisfy the defini-
tion of the ban because it does not terminate the pregnancy by purposely inserting a suction de-
vice into the fetal skull to excavate the contents of the skull.").
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because each places an undue burden on the woman's right to choose
whether or not to have an abortion. 145 The court found each statute's
definition of "partial-birth abortion" sufficiently ambiguous so as to
prohibit not only the D&X method but the D&E procedure as well. 146
Because the D&E procedure is the most commonly used second
trimester procedure, the statutes creates an undue burden. 147 The court
compared the similarities and overlap of the D&X and D&E procedures
to show how the statutes fail to provide a term that differentiated the
two procedures. 148 For example, the statutes' focus on prohibiting an
abortion when dismemberment occurs outside the uterus fails to
meaningfully distinguish between D&X and D&E. Both procedures
may involve dismemberment outside the uterus. 149  Further, the court
145. The statutes were from Iowa, Nebraska, and Arkansas. See Planned Parenthood v.
Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1999) (Iowa); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1151 (8th
Cir. 1999) (Nebraska), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000); Little Rock Family Planning Servs.,
P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1999) (Arkansas). Because the court held that the
statute creates an undue burden, the court did not address the vagueness issue asserted by the
plaintiffs. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 388; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1146 n.4; Jegley, 192 F.3d at 796.
146. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 389; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150; Jegley, 192 F.3d at 798. The
Nebraska definition of partial-birth abortion is "an abortion procedure in which the person per-
forming the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn
child and completing the delivery .... the term partially delivers vaginally . . . means deliberately
and intentionally delivering ... a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-326(9) (1998). Arkansas defines partial-birth abortion as "an abortion in which
the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before taking the life
of the fetus and completing the delivery." ARK. CODE ANN. §5-61-202 (Michie 1998). The defi-
nition found in the Iowa statute is "an abortion in which a person partially vaginally delivers a
living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery." IOWA CODE ANN. §
707.8(A)(l)(d) (West 1999). "'Vaginally delivers' . . . means deliberately and intentionally de-
livering ... a living fetus or a substantial portion of a living fetus." IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 707.8(A)(2). The court noted that the slight differences between the states' statutes were insig-
nificant and therefore applied the same analysis to all. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 387; Jegley, 192
F.3d at 795.
147. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 388; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1151; Jegley, 192 F.3d at 797-98.
148. For example, the court considered the term "substantial portion" used in the Nebraska
and Iowa statutes. This term, however, is not defined within the statutes. See Miller, 195 F.3d at
388-89; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150. The Arkansas statute does not use the term "substantial por-
tion" like the Nebraska and Iowa statutes; it only requires that the fetus be "partially" delivered.
See Jegley, 192 F.3d at 798. For the purposes of its analysis, the court stated, "'partially' is not
appreciably different from 'substantial portion.' The effect is the same." Id. The court proposed
that a "substantial portion" of the fetus must include an arm or a leg, which means that a doctor
who "brings an arm or [a] leg into the vagina as part of the D&E procedure therefore violates the
statute." Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150. The scienter requirement that the procedure be done "delib-
erately and intentionally" does not limit the application of the statute to only D&X because doc-
tors who bring an arm or leg into the vagina while performing the D&E do so deliberately and
intentionally. See id. at 1150; Miller, 195 F.3d at 389.
149. Several doctors testified in Carhart that the dismemberment of the fetus that occurs in
the D&E procedure does not necessarily occur in the uterus and that it is actually more often done
in the vagina. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1147. Furthermore, the court noted the point of fetal
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found no way to interpret the statutes to avoid creating an undue burden
on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion and, at the same time,
retain the basic structure of the statutes as intended by the
legislatures.' 5
0
B. Circuits Upholding the Constitutionality of
Partial-Birth Abortion Bans
1. Fourth Circuit Decision
The Fourth Circuit, in Richmond Medical Center for Women v.
Gilmore,15' became the second circuit court to evaluate the partial-birth
abortion procedure. While this case was pending before the district
court, the district judge granted a preliminary injunction against
enforcing the partial-birth abortion laws.152  The defendants appealed
the district court's refusal to stay the injunction pending appeal. The
appellate judge granted the defendants' motion, thereby reversing the
district court's preliminary injunction of the ban. 153  Although the
appellate judge did not rule on the merits of the case, 154 the judge
criticized the district court's preliminary finding that the statute is
unconstitutional. 155 The plaintiffs appealed the sole appellate judge's
reversal of the injunction to a panel of three appellate judges. The panel
death is not an accurate gauge under the statute because it occurs at different stages during each
D&E or D&X procedure. See id. at 1148; see also Jegley, 192 F.3d at 797. There is no universal
definition of fetal demise. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1148 n.8. The parties in Carhart, however,
agreed that a heart beat indicated a living fetus. See id.
150. See Miller, 195 F.3d at 389; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150.
151. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), affid by panel
on reh'g, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998). In Gilmore, three medical organizations and two doctors
brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a Virginia state law prohibiting partial-birth abortions. See
id. at 327.
152. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 799 (E.D. Va.
1998), rev'd, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd by panel on reh'g, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
The court applied the "hardship balancing test" before determining the injunction should be
granted. See id. at 806-29. The court stated that risk of prosecution for the plaintiffs would "chill
the plaintiffs' ability to provide safe medical care for their patients." Id. at 809. The court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the claim that the statute was unconstitutional.
See id. at 819 (regarding vagueness), 827 (regarding undue burden).
153. See Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 327.
154. See id. at 328.
155. See id. First, the judge stated that because none of the plaintiffs performed the D&X
procedure, they did not have a "reasonable fear of prosecution" and, thus, lacked standing to
challenge the ban. Id. The judge narrowly interpreted the statute so as to reach only the D&X
procedure. See id. at 328-30. He concluded that the district court "all but presumed the statute
unconstitutional and, where the slightest ambiguity in the statute's language arguably existed,
assumed... that the State would adopt and enforce a construction of the statute that would render
it unconstitutional." Id. at 332.
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denied the plaintiff's motion to reinstate the preliminary injunction,
thereby enforcing the sole appellate judge's opinion that the Virginia
law was likely to be found constitutional upon further review. 156
2. Seventh Circuit Decision
The Seventh Circuit twice considered partial-birth abortion laws but
reached opposite conclusions. 157 In Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin
v. Doyle,158 the Seventh Circuit considered the Wisconsin partial-birth
abortion law. 159  In a 2-1 decision, the Seventh Circuit granted a
preliminary injunction against the partial-birth abortion law.' 60 The
court reasoned that the Wisconsin statute was likely to be found
unconstitutional after a full trial because it obstructed a woman's
constitutional right to an abortion. 161
The Court of Appeals, en banc, reviewed the same case in October,
1999.162 In Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 163 the court jointly considered the
constitutionality of the Illinois and Wisconsin partial-birth abortion
156. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998). The dis-
senting judge compared one physician's description of D&E abortions to the statutory definition
of "partial-birth abortion." See id. at 304-05 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The judge concluded
the statute could apply to the procedure used by this physician. See id. (Murnaghan, J., dissent-
ing). The judge also agreed with the district court that the statute was vague and, thus, that
abortion providers were "without fair notice of the line between lawful and unlawful conduct."
Id. at 306 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the judge concluded that the lack of a mater-
nal health exception created an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion when continuing
with the pregnancy would put her health at risk. See id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
After a trial on the merits, the district court concluded that the partial-birth abortion ban is un-
constitutional and issued a permanent injunction against the statute. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for
Women v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441,445 (E.D. Va 1999).
157. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (granting pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of the Wisconsin partial-birth abortion statute), vacated
sub nom. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.W.L.
3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000), with Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc),
(denying preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Illinois and Wisconsin partial-birth
abortion statutes), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156).
158. Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated sub nom. Hope
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan.
10, 2000) (No. 99-1156).
159. See id. at 464.
160. See id. at 464, 471.
161. See id.
162. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 861.
163. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156). Hope Clinic involved a consolidated review
of two cases: Hope Clinic and Doyle. See id. at 861. In Hope Clinic, abortion providers brought
suit against the Illinois Attorney General and the State's Attorney, arguing the unconstitutionality
of the Illinois partial-birth abortion statute. See id. In Doyle, abortion providers similarly chal-
lenged a Wisconsin partial-birth abortion statute. See id.
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laws. 164 Contrary to its prior decision, the court concluded that with the
help of state courts, both states partial-birth abortion statutes are capable
of constitutional application. 1
65
a. Majority Opinion
The court recognized that the partial-birth abortion laws at issue
focused on the D&X procedure. 166 D&X is often singled-out because it
is particularly gruesome in comparison to other methods of abortion. 167
The court evaluated the constitutionality of the partial-birth abortion
bans, considering the challenge of vagueness and whether the bans
imposed an undue burden on women's rights.' 68 These two issues were
linked when considering partial-birth abortion laws because if the
statutes were vague, they prohibited other methods of abortion, such as
the induction, suction curettage, or D&E procedures. Thus, the court
stated that prohibiting any of these "principal methods of performing
abortions in the United States" would create an undue burden to a
woman's right to an abortion. 169  First, the court concluded that even
though the "legal definition is an imperfect match for the medical
definition of D&X," the statutes in question clearly communicate that
the ban is intended only for the D&X method. 70 Second, the court
found that prohibiting the D&X procedure is not an undue burden on a
woman's right to abortion. 71
The court held that the statutes should not be enjoined because the
state courts could "save their statutes" from vagueness. 172 The Supreme
164. See id. at 861.
165. See id. (deferring to state courts to form a constitutionally permissible construction of the
statutes).
166. See id.
167. "It is this combination of coming so close to delivering a live child with the death of the
fetus by reducing the size of the skull that not only distinguishes D&X from D&E medically but
also causes the adverse public (and legislative) reaction." Id. at 862.
168. See id. at 861.
169. Id. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court established the un-
due burden standard to test the constitutionality of a restriction on abortion. See id. at 877 (de-
fining undue burden as having "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus"); see also supra Part II.C (discussing Ca-
sey).
170. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 863. Based on the recent Supreme Court case, City of Chicago
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the court found that state courts should clarify ambiguities of
state laws. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 864. The issue before the Court in Morales was whether
Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. See Morales, 527 U.S. at
43. The Court held that federal courts are bound by the state courts' interpretations of vague
laws. See id.
171. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 871.
172. See id. at 864-65.
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Courts of Illinois and Wisconsin could do this in two ways: first, they
could help define the statutes; second, they could grant injunctions to
eliminate the risk of improper prosecution. 173
The court laid out several options for defining the statutes. 174  The
court suggested that the state courts "assimilate" the statutory definition
of partial-birth abortion with the medical definition of D&X. 175  The
court also suggested that because there is a "central core of meaning" in
the statute, the state courts can define the "outer boundaries" through
their common law decisions. 176  Finally, the court suggested that state
courts apply the partial-birth abortion statutes' mental state
requirements to a physician's mental state or knowledge regarding "the
medical procedure being performed."' 177
Although the court's requirement that the state courts sharpen the
definition of "partial-birth abortion" meant that the statutes are not
absolutely clear, the statutes are not so vague as to violate the Due
Process Clause. 178  Because the court believed there is a central
understanding of what is prohibited by the laws, physicians will have
sufficient notice about what is prohibited while the courts are busy
defining the outlying boundaries. 179 Furthermore, the precautionary
injunction granted by the court limited the prosecution under the statute
to only the D&X procedure. 80 Therefore, the plaintiffs' contention that
173. See id. at 864-71.
174. See id. at 865-69.
175. See id. at 865.
176. Id. at 867-68. The Supreme Court also used this method in interpreting the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ I and 2, and Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
making "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" a crime for commissioned officers. Id.
at 868.
177. Id. at 866-67. For example, the Illinois statute provides: "Any person who knowingly
performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus or infant is guilty of a Class 4
felony." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/10 (West 1999). According to the court's suggestion, the
statute would require that the "physician know that the medical procedure being performed is a
Ipartial-birth abortion' and not simply that the physician know that he is performing particular
physical acts." Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 867. The court also relied on the Supreme Court's
reading of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 to show how the Court was "exceptionally creative with
statutory allusions to mental states." Id. at 866-67. The statute makes conspiracy to deprive
someone's constitutional rights a crime, and § 242 makes it a crime to deprive someone's consti-
tutional rights under color of law. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 241 (West 2000). The court encouraged the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's admirable way to "save" a stat-
ute. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 866-67.
178. Due process is violated when a law is so vague that a reasonable person would not have
notice that a certain behavior is prohibited. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 869 (citing United
States v, Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977);
Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964)).
179. See id. at 868.
180. See id. at 869-70.
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the vagueness of the statute will cause fearful doctors not to perform
other, presumptively legal, abortion procedures, had no weight. 181 The
court also looked at statistics from Indiana to compare the effect of that
state's ban of partial-birth abortion on the number of abortions generally
performed in that state. This was illustrative for the court because
Indiana's statute is similar to Wisconsin and Illinois' statutes. 182  The
court found that the data indicates no apparent effect of the state's ban
of D&X on the legal D&E procedure. The court thus concluded that the
bans do not have the negative effect of discouraging other abortion
methods. 183
The second part of the court's analysis focused on whether banning
D&X is an undue burden on a woman's right to choose abortion. 184 The
court divided the plaintiffs' claim that prohibiting D&X was an undue
burden into two arguments. First, the plaintiffs argued that, according
to Casey, all abortion laws must permit abortions when they are
necessary to protect the life and health of the woman. 185  Both the
Illinois and Wisconsin statutes provide one exception only when the
mother's life is endangered. 186  The Hope court rejected the plurality
holding in Casey concerning the health of the mother as a universal rule,
especially to a procedure that is never necessary to protect a patient's
health. 187 Second, the court rejected the argument that any prohibition
181. See id. at 871.
182. See id. at 870-71 (relying on data from Indiana's State Epidemiologist). The Indiana
statute defines "partial birth abortion" as "an abortion in which the person performing the abor-
tion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the deliv-
ery." IND. CODE ANN. § 16-18-2-267.5 (West Supp. 1999).
183. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 870-71.
184. See id. at 871-75. Because the court did not find that the statutes effectively prohibit the
D&E procedures, it did not follow the Eighth Circuit's reasoning for finding that the bans cause
an undue burden. See id. The Eighth Circuit found that because the bans reached the D&E pro-
cedure, the statute creates an undue burden. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 388
(8th Cir. 1999); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1151 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.
Ct. 865 (2000); Little Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir.
1999). The court went on to state that because none of the plaintiff doctors in Illinois used the
D&X procedure, they do not have standing to challenge the ban on D&X on the basis that it is an
undue burden. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 871-72.
185. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 871-72.
186. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/10 (1999) ("necessary to save the life of a mother ..
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.16(3) (West Supp. 1999) ("necessary to save the life of a woman ... .
187. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 871-72. The court stated:
The point that the plurality made was that a statute that lacks a "health exception" may
unduly burden the woman's right to obtain an abortion before the fetus has reached vi-
ability; when state law offers many safe options to that end, the regulation of an addi-
tional option does not produce an undue burden.
Id. at 871. In the Wisconsin case, because the district court found that "the D&X procedure is
never necessary from the perspective of the patient's health," the statute does not burden women
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of a medical procedure is an undue burden on a woman's right to
abortion. The plaintiffs' reading of each statute to require a physician's
case-by-case evaluation of the health reasons for a woman's choice of
abortion would effectively prohibit the State from regulating any
abortion technique. 188 The court stated that this conclusion leaves the
term "undue burden" meaningless, thereby rendering the Casey standard
ineffective. 189
b. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, written by Chief Judge Posner, first criticized the
majority decision for overstepping the court's scope of authority in
interpreting the state statutes. 190 Specifically, the dissent disagreed with
the court's conclusion that the statutes are not vague because they only
prohibit the D&X procedure. 191 According to the dissent, the majority's
conclusion is inconsistent with the court's issuance of a precautionary
injunction and its suggestion that state courts define the laws. 192 The
dissent argued that the court overstepped its power by enjoining laws
that, by the court's arguments, neither violate federal law nor create a
significant danger of violating federal law. 193  The majority opinion
relied on the assurances of state law enforcement authorities to find that
there is a low probability of improper enforcement of the statutes. 194
The dissent argued that by requiring additional assurances from law
seeking abortions because other procedures are always available. Id. at 872.
188. See id. at 873. Because of the medical technicalities involved, the Seventh Circuit
stressed that jury review of independent medical judgement is not ideal. See id. ("A health ex-
ception, where jurors rather than physicians assessed health, would be an order of magnitude
worse than the ambiguity plaintiffs perceive in the partial-birth-abortion laws."). This would un-
dermine faith in the judgment of medical professionals. See id. The other alternative is to con-
clude that a physician's assessment is incontestable. See id. at 874. The problem this presents,
the court stated, is that some doctors would believe the option they chose was the best, "even if
the medical profession as a whole disagrees." Id.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 876 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Posner wrote that the majority "ex-
pand[ed] federal judicial power over the states by a method that the Supreme Court has never
countenanced and that violates Article III of the Constitution." Id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Posner was joined by Circuit Judges Rovner, Wood, and Evans.
191. See id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 877-78 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 877 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). One violation of federal law is infringing on
someone's constitutional rights. In order to enjoin a statute, there must be a nontrivial probability
of injury by enforcing the statute. See id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (citing Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-07 (1983); Murphy
v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998)).
194. See id. at 865 ("The Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin ... tell us that their
statutes are concerned only with the D&X procedure and will be enforced only against its use.").
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enforcement authorities, the laws themselves are unconstitutionally
vague. 195
The dissent also criticized the majority for suggesting state courts re-
write unconstitutionally vague statutes to cure the ambiguities. 196  The
dissent argued that the inadequacy of the terms used in the statutes
cannot be saved by interpreting the statutes' mental state
requirements.197 Furthermore, Judge Posner asserted that vague statutes
will unnecessarily deter constitutionally protected conduct and that, as a
result, a rational person may avoid such protected conduct because it
might fall within the statute's prohibitions. 198 Additionally, because the
injunction limits enforcement only to D&X procedures, the courts will
not get the chance to clarify the statutes. 199
The dissent next discussed the undue burden on the woman if the
D&X procedure was banned. 200 The dissent argued that the statutes are
based only on moral considerations, not on protecting the health or life
of the mother.20' The dissent noted that late-term abortions are more
likely than first-trimester abortions to be motivated by health
considerations rather than mere convenience. 202 Thus, the dissent found
it perplexing that there are no exceptions to the statutes that provide for
the protection of maternal health.20 3
Moreover, the dissent proposed that challengers targeted D&X
simply because the gruesome details of the procedure have been
195. See id. at 878 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Also, "the court both rejects the charge that the
statutes are unconstitutionally vague and, by enjoining their application outside their small clear
core until they are clarified by the state courts, holds that they are too vague to provide fair
warning-which means they are unconstitutionally vague." Id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
196. See id. at 876-78 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the court's reliance on
its interpretation of City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), holding that federal court
review of state statutes for vagueness must be postponed until state courts have considered the
statute. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 877 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). The cases cited by the ma-
jority "involve federal courts either narrowing federal statutes that are fairly susceptible of being
narrowed or accepting as authoritative a narrowing interpretation of a state statute by a state
court." Id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 876-78 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
198. See id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 886 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Also, because the penalty for violation is high
and the doctors have much to lose (in Wisconsin, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment), the
doctors are unlikely to give the courts the chance to define the borders by testing the outside lim-
its of the statute. See id. at 889 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 878-85 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
201. See id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 878-79 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Without a health exception, D&X is prohib-
ited even if the available alternatives would cause permanent sterilization or paralysis. See id. at
881 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 878 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
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publicized. 204 The dissent stated that in reality, the "position of the
feet" is the only substantial difference between an acceptable D&E
procedure and a felonious D&X procedure. 20 5  The dissent further
proposed that the statutes are victims of publicized inaccuracies
surrounding differences among abortion methods. 2°6 The dissent stated
that the statutes' use of medically inaccurate terminology and
emotionally charged words did not clarify the distinctions between
procedures. 20 7  The dissent then accused the district court of being
driven by emotions because of the questionably biased findings of
fact.208 It also criticized the majority for considering only the
Wisconsin district court's findings of fact, when the Illinois district
court's affidavits indicated contradictory information.209  The dissent
found that banning the D&X procedure is an undue burden on a
woman's right to choose abortion and is unconstitutional.210
204. See id. at 880 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). "[Piublic support for the laws was also
based ... on sheer ignorance of the medical realities of late-term abortion." Id. (Posner, C.J., dis-
senting).
205. See id. at 879 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Because the fetus's skull is usually too large to
pass through the dilated cervix, both procedures require reducing the size of the skull by similar
methods. See id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
206. See id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting "there is no meaningful difference between
the forbidden and the privileged practice").
207. See id. at 882 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). The Illinois and Wisconsin statutes use the
terms "child" and "infant," respectively, to refer to the fetus from the moment of conception. See
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/5 (West 1999); WIS. STAT. § 940.16(l)(a) (West 1998). Applying
these definitions to all abortions in general would make any abortion infanticide. See Hope
Clinic, 195 F.3d at 882 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
208. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 882-84 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 882-83 (Posner J., dissenting). The Wisconsin district court judge recognized
advantages of D&X for women's health but then "concluded that the procedure is never neces-
sary to protect the woman's health." Id. at 882 (Posner J., dissenting). Furthermore, the district
court relied on the testimony of only one physician and ignored suggestions by other courts that
questioned this physician's credibility because of his political convictions. See id. (Posner J., dis-
senting). The court of appeals found support for the Wisconsin district court findings in two
medical papers that focused on the ethical dilemmas of late-term abortions while overlooking an
article that supports ACOG's policy that the decision should remain with the physicians, not the
legislatures. See id. (Posner J., dissenting) (discussing David A. Grimes, The Continuing Need
for Late Abortions, 280 JAMA 747 (1998) (concurring with the ACOG's opinion that the D&X
procedure should be an option for the physician, and not cited by the district court); Nancy G.
Romer, The Medical Facts of Partial-Birth Abortion, in 3 NEXUS: A JOURNAL OF OPINION 57
(1998) (written by a pro-life doctor concerning ethical as opposed to medical concerns); M.
LeRoy Sprang & Mark G. Neerhoff, Rationale for Banning Abortions Late in Pregnancy, 280
JAMA 744 (1998)).
210. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 885 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Partial-birth abortion laws have been challenged both as
unconstitutionally vague and as an undue burden on a woman's right to
choose an abortion. Two courts of appeals have found that the undue
burden is created because, in addition to prohibiting D&X, the laws also
prohibit D&E, the most common second term abortion technique.
211
Only one court of appeals has held that a narrowly read statute that
prohibits only D&X is constitutional.212
The essential issue remains unresolved: can states proscribe a method
of abortion if the legislatures consider it offensive? The answer is no
for two reasons. First, prohibiting the D&X procedure alone is an
undue burden on women's right to abortion. 213  Second, it is not
possible for the legislature to succinctly and fairly proscribe this
method.214 The best option is to allow the medical community to
evaluate this procedure and respond independently according to its
conclusion. 215
A. Banning D&X Is an Undue Burden on a Woman's Right to Choose
an Abortion
Pre-viability bans on the D&X procedure are unconstitutional
because they place an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an
abortion. 216 These bans create an undue burden for three reasons. First,
there is no valid state interest that overrides concerns for women's
health. 217 Second, the unavailability of D&X forces women to undergo
what may be a riskier method of abortion or forego the abortion
altogether even when it is in the mother's best health interest to abort
211. See supra Part III.A (discussing the holdings of Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voino-
vich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998), and Carhart v. Stenberg,
192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000)).
212. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 874; supra Part III.B.2.a (discussing majority opinion of
Hope Clinic v. Ryan).
213. See infra Part IV.A (asserting that banning D&X is an undue burden on a woman's right
to choose an abortion).
214. See infra Part IV.B (asserting that drafting a constitutionally permissible statute is a leg-
islative impossibility).
215. See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text (discussing the importance the medical
community has in evaluating the safety of the D&X procedure).
216. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (stating that laws creating undue
burdens on a woman's right to choose abortion are unconstitutional).
217. See infra Part IV.A.1 (asserting that no valid state interest overrides concerns for
women's health).
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the pregnancy. 218  Third, the bans create a substantial obstacle for the
class of women seeking late-term abortions. 2
19
1. No Valid State Interest Overrides Concerns for Women's Health
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court held that valid
state interests permit state laws to regulate abortion before fetus
viability so long as the laws do not pose an undue burden on a woman's
choice of abortion. 220  As such, any burden is "undue" when the state
does not have a valid interest in the law, especially when maternal
health may be at risk.221
States began to pass bans on the D&X procedure, usually labeled
"partial-birth abortion," shortly after Representative Robert K. Dornan
of California submitted Dr. Haskell's paper to the House of
Representatives. 222  Congress also attempted to pass legislation
prohibiting this procedure. 223 The legislative bodies contend that these
laws support two valid state interests: (1) protecting fetal life and (2)
protecting maternal health. 224  In reality, however, the bans protect
neither of these interests. 225
Both pro-choice and pro-life groups have been active in responding
to these laws. Pro-choice groups oppose partial-birth abortion bans
because they believe that the laws are solely political statements
intended to "dramatize the ugliness of abortions." 226  The D&X
procedure has been singled out, according to opponents of the bans,
218. See infra Part IV.A.2 (asserting that the partial-birth abortion bans may force women to
choose riskier procedures).
219. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the Casey undue burden standard as applied to partial-
birth abortion procedures).
220. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
221. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting)
("The right of abortion is unduly burdened by any law that endangers the woman's health"), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156); see also Women's
Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1071-72 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d
187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998).
222. See 139 CONG. REC. E1092 (1993); see also supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text
(describing reaction to Dr. Haskell's paper).
223. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing proposed federal legislation).
224. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (holding that the states have an interest in protecting mater-
nal health and fetal life throughout pregnancy).
225. See Massie, supra note 7, at 364 (discussing the opinion of Professor Louis Michael
Seidman, Georgetown University Law Center, that federal legislation supports "no legitimate
purpose").
226. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 880 (Posner, CJ., dissenting); see also Andrews, supra note 7,
at 521 n.l. "Partial-birth abortion is not a medical procedure that is defined anywhere in the sci-
entific medical literature. Rather, it is an inflammatory term intended by anti-choice groups to
obscure medical reality." Andrews, supra note 7, at 521 n. 1.
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solely because the details of the procedure have been publicized.227
However, other lesser-known abortion methods may involve the same
or substantially similar procedures228 or may be equally offensive in
some other way.229  Some pro-choice supporters believe the ban of
D&X is just the tip of the iceberg and that it will lead to not only the
ban of other abortion methods but ultimately the prohibition of
abortion. 230  Alternatively, pro-life groups support the bans because the
D&X procedure comes uncomfortably close to delivering a live child,231
causing people to equate the procedure to infanticide. 232 Moreover,
supporters of these bans have stated that the procedure used to reduce
the size of the skull is unnecessarily cruel.23 3 The concerns raised by
227. See Planned Parenthood v. Doyle 162 F.3d 463, 477 (7th Cir. 1998) (Manion, J., dis-
senting) ("[A]II methods [of abortion] are gruesome. But this is the one method that has been at
least partially exposed to the light of day"), vacated sub nom. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857
(7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156);
Massie, supra note 7, at 379 ("[I]t is the shock value of the physical description of the procedure
upon which its opponents often seem to rely in garnering support for their position.").
228. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 859 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (remarking that if a woman
chose to abort a hydrocephalic fetus (water on the brain), both the D&E and D&X procedures
would require reduction of the skull). There is "no meaningful difference between the forbidden
and privileged practice." Id.; see also infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the problem with terminology
in statutes).
229. See Doyle, 162 F.3d at 470 (Manion, J., dissenting) (detailing how other third trimester
abortion procedures are equally horrible).
230. See Lezzer, supra note 7, at 369 (arguing that upholding partial-birth abortion bans
"open[s] the back door for legislators to attack abortion one procedure at a time"); Massie, supra
note 6, at 307 n.24 (quoting statements from various Senators from The Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 248, at 13-14,
61, 66 (1995)). Senator Feingold stated "although the focus of this legislation is, in fact, one par-
ticular type of abortion used in late-term abortions, I fear that this is really an assault upon the
basic right to have an abortion." Massie, supra note 7, at 307 n.24. Some pro-choice opponents
have expressed their goal to prohibit all abortion procedures. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 534-
35 (quoting Christopher H. Smith, a Republican Representative from New Jersey, and Gary
Bauer, the head of the Family Research Council).
231. "A number of the ban's adherents have been heavily influenced by the visual image of a
fetus whose body is visible before completion of the abortion process." Massie, supra note 7, at
363 n.339.
232. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 862 (stating that some critics believe D&X "borders on in-
fanticide"). Indeed, at a hearing on partial-birth abortion, it was stated:
This hearing focuses on partial birth [sic] abortion because while every abortion sadly
takes a human life, this method takes that life as the baby emerges from the mother's
womb while the baby is in the birth canal. The difference between the partial-birth
abortion procedure and homicide is a mere 3 inches.
Massie, supra note 7, at 323 n.103 (quoting a statement by Chairman Canady, Partial-Birth
Abortion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong. 64 (1995)); see also Radloff, supra note 101, at 1557 (suggesting that bans of
"partial-birth infanticide" would be constitutional); Rivenburg, supra note 30, at E-I (remarking
that the Catholic bishops consider the D&X procedure similar to infanticide).
233. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 862 (stating that opponents believe D&X is "needlessly
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proponents of the bans, however, do not translate into valid state
interests.
First, the proposed laws do not truly protect fetal life. Although
partial-birth abortion laws prohibit one method of abortion, the laws do
not prevent women from ultimately having abortions; the laws merely
require that women choose alternate methods. 234  As these laws still
allow women to have abortions, they do little to protect the life of a
fetus. 235  Some legislatures consider preventing unnecessary cruelty to
the human fetus as part of the state's interest in protecting fetal life.236
Although courts have acknowledged this as a valid state concern,
medical evidence presented on the issue of fetal pain was found to be
inconclusive. 237  Also, courts have found the D&X method of abortion
no more cruel than the D&E method because both often require the
same procedures. 238
Second, the bans do not support a valid state interest in protecting
maternal health. In fact, contrary to this state interest, prohibiting the
D&X procedure may actually put a woman's health at risk.239  The
medical community has not reached a consensus on the benefits of the
cruel"). But see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing methods of reducing size
of fetal skull in D&E procedure).
234. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 875 (stating "partial-birth-abortion laws do not diminish the
number of abortions"); Massie, supra note 7, at 346 n.227 (quoting several U.S. Senators who
supported the bill even though they acknowledged that it would not ban abortion). Women can
still have, for example, D&E or induction method abortions.
235. "[The statute] does not appear to accomplish much in the way of saving babies." Hope
Clinic, 195 F.3d at 879 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Doyle 162 F.3d
463, 477 (Manion, J., dissenting) (7th Cir. 1998), vacated sub nom. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195
F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-
1156)).
236. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1072 (S.D. Ohio
1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998).
237. One medical opinion concluded that "a fetus who is aborted by the D&E procedure,
which involves dismemberment, might experience as much discomfort as a fetus who is aborted
by the D&X procedure." Id. at 1073; see generally Deborah Sontag, A Vote on Abortion: Doctors
Say It's Just One Way, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at AI (discussing the debate over D&X in the
House of Representatives).
238. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1074 n.29 ("[Tlhis Court fails to see how [D&XI is more
cruel than the D&E procedure-which involves the dismemberment of the fetus and, sometimes,
the crushing of its skull"); see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing methods
of reducing size of fetal skull in D&E procedure).
239. District courts have ruled both ways of the issue of a woman's health. See, e.g., Hope
Clinic, 195 F.3d at 883 (Posner, CJ., dissenting) (indicating the difficulty an appellate court faces
when simultaneously reviewing cases from different district courts with opposite findings of
fact). A Wisconsin district court held that D&X is "never necessary to protect the woman's
health." Id. at 882 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Alternatively, an Illinois district court relied on
uncontested affidavits that included facts regarding the medical advantages of the D&X proce-
dure. See id. at 883 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
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D&X procedure. 240 Supporters of D&X bans conclude that D&X is not
accepted by the medical community because of the absence of scientific
reports affirming that D&X is safer than other abortion procedures. 241
However, this conclusion fails to consider the specific difficulties that
complicate an accurate, nationwide study of the D&X procedure. 242
Regardless, representatives of the medical community have expressed
opinions that they, not the legislatures, should reach the ultimate
conclusion regarding the use of D&X.24 3
240. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of the American
Medical Association (AMA) and the American College of Obstetricians (ACOG) that D&X may
be the safest procedure for some women, despite the lack of medical studies to prove it).
241. See Cook, supra note 8, at 67 ("There is no record of these procedures in any medical
text, journals, or on-line medical service. There is no known quality assurance, credentialing, or
other standard assessment usually associated with newly-described surgical techniques"); Nancy
W. Dickey, AMA Supports H.R. 1122 as Amended, Press Release, May 20, 1997 (available at
<http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/releases/1997/hr521.htm>) (stating "[D&X] is a procedure
which ... has no history in peer reviewed medical literature or in accepted medical practice de-
velopment"). But see Massie, supra note 7, at 309 (stating that the available medical literature on
the D&X procedure reflects a lack of consensus).
242. See Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the
procedure has not been studied systematically, maybe because of its infrequency, novelty, and
controversiality"), vacated sub nom. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999), petition
for cert. filed, 68 U.S.W.L. 3840 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000). The district court in Voinovich noted:
First, the D&X procedure is relatively new.., and it will take time for other practitio-
ners to begin using and evaluating the procedure. Second, given the security concerns
which must be considered by doctors who perform abortions, physicians who use the
D&X procedure may be understandably reluctant to publicly acknowledge that they
use this procedure, and may be even more reluctant to participate in a study and pub-
lish the results. Finally .... funding for studies of abortion methods was cut drastically
in the early 1980s, and there have been no large-scale abortion studies since that time.
Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1069.
Many doctors perform variations of the D&E procedure that conform to the description of
D&X by Dr. Haskell but do not believe they perform the D&X procedure. See Voinovich, 130
F.3d at 200 (stating that the D&E procedure can involve the purposeful use of suction to remove
contents of the fetal skull).
243. ACOG's 1997 statement and technical bulletin states: "[a]lthough D&X is never the only
medically appropriate option, choice still should be reserved to the physician." See Hope Clinic,
195 F.3d at 872 (referencing the ACOG, Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction (1997));
AMA, Report 26 of the Board of Trustees (1997); Sontag, supra note 237, at Al, A24. A doctor
interviewed stated, "[D&X] is not something I rely on, but I find it absolutely bizarre that Con-
gress wants to ban it... it's as if they were to forbid me to use a certain kind of suture." Sontag,
supra note 237, at A24. But see Dickey, supra note 241.
Although the AMA officially supported the 1997 version of the federal proposed ban, the
chairwoman of the association, Dr. Dickey, stated, "We would prefer to have no legislation."
Robert Pear, A.M.A. Abortion Stand Splits Its Members, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1997, at A16.
Some members of the AMA disagreed with the support of the federal proposed legislation. See
Della De Lafuente, AMA Members on Both Sides in Late-Term Abortion Debate, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, June 24, 1994, at 20; Pear, supra, at A16. Furthermore, the AMA's stand has been ques-
tioned as more politically motivated, rather than solely based on medical opinion. See Dewar,
supra note 50, at Al.
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Therefore, contrary to the claims of state legislatures, partial-birth
abortion laws do not support any valid state interests.244 Bans of the
D&X procedure do not protect fetal life or the health of the mother.
245
These laws, in fact, are merely statements of legislators' moral
convictions. 246 Legislatures are free to enact statutes that reflect their
values.2 47 When constitutional rights are infringed, however, legislators
should not let their moral views govern their decisions.248  This kind of
prohibition does not advance a state interest but rather creates an undue
burden on the constitutional right of a woman to choose abortion.
249
2. The Bans May Force Women to Choose Riskier Procedures
Partial-birth abortion laws also create an undue burden on women by
forcing them to choose an alternative procedure or no procedure. This
result may pose more risks to maternal health or life than the D&X
procedure itself. Although medical journals have not shown the D&X
procedure to be safer than all alternatives in every instance, 250 the
American Medical Association ("AMA") and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG") have stated that D&X may
be the safest procedure. 25
1
244. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text (discussing how stated purpose of pro-
tecting against cruelty to fetus is erroneous).
245. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text (discussing how legislation will not im-
pact number of abortions performed).
246. Furthermore, "when that right [of the state to regulate the practice of medicine] comes
into collision with a constitutional right, the state has to give a reason for regulating medicine in a
way that impairs the interest that the constitutional right seeks to protect." Doyle, 162 F.3d at 471
(Manion, J., dissenting).
247. See Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that legislators may
enact laws prohibiting conduct without showing demonstrated harm), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1024
(1998).
248. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (7th Cir. 1999)
("But if a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its behalf is that it is the
vehicle that legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to those rights, the burden is un-
due"), petitionfor cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156).
249. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (balancing state interest and
a woman's constitutional right to choose abortion).
250. Peer review articles would help the credibility of D&X, but "the lack of a study in a peer
review journal does not, ipso facto, mean that there are no benefits, or no risks." Women's Med.
Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1069 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998).
251. See Doyle, 162 F.3d at 468 (citing AMA, Report 26 of the Board of Trustees (1997);
ACOG, Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction (1997)). D&X "may be the best or most ap-
propriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a
woman, and only the doctor, in consultation with the patient, based upon the woman's particular
circumstances can make this decision." Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 883-84 (Posner, C.J., dissent-
ing) (quoting ACOG, Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction (1997)). But see Dickey, supra
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Many of the articles discussing the recognized benefits of D&X focus
on reduced risks to the woman's health as well as the economic realities
of abortion. 252  General benefits of removing a fetus intact (the
procedure in D&X) include reduction of the following risks: (1) uterine
infection; 253 (2) infection of remaining fetal tissue;254 (3) lacerations to
maternal tissue and consequent blood loss;255 and (4) increased time
spent under anesthesia. 25
6
Patients who suffer from certain medical conditions would also
benefit from a D&X procedure instead of D&E or induction. These
patients include those who are more susceptible to uterine injury
because of previous Caesarian sections or uterine scarring, 257 those
requesting an intact fetus for genetic testing,258 and those whose fetus is
in the "double footling breech" position. 259
Although the medical advantages of D&X are many, certain
disadvantages exist as well. These disadvantages include the following:
(1) D&X requires a high degree of surgical skill;260 (2) the method may
note 241 (noting AMA's support for federal bill).
252. Because the procedure can be done under local anesthesia on an outpatient basis, it costs
less than a procedure which has to be performed in a hospital. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at
1071 (noting that some hospitals do not permit elective abortions); Haskell, supra note 38, at
E1092; Cook, supra note 8, at 66 (stating most of Dr. Haskell's patients receiving abortions by
D&X were of "lower age, education, or socioeconomic status").
253. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 884 (Posner, C.J., dissenting); Richmond Med. Ctr. for
Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 817 (E.D. Va. 1998), rev'd, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir.
1998), affd by panel on reh'g, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998); Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1070.
254. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 884 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
255. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1065, 1067-69. The reasons for removing a fetal head
intact during a D&E are:
"[T]he edges of the fetal skull are sharp enough to lacerate the maternal uterine blood
vessels.. " The goal is therefore to place the suction cannula into the skull in order to
remove its contents and make it smaller, thereby allowing it to removed intact, in order
to minimize lacerations.
Id. at 1065 (quoting trial testimony). These reasons are applicable to D&X because the same pro-
cedure is used to remove the fetal head intact.
256. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 884 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Less time under anesthesia
is a generally accepted benefit within the medical community. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F.
Supp. 507, 527 (D. Neb. 1997) (noting that "less operative time.., means less risk of hemor-
rhage, less total bleeding and less risk of infection"); Massie, supra note 7, at 316 n.61 (noting
less surgical time as a benefit of D&X).
257. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1067.
258. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 884 (Posner, C.J., dissenting); Massie, supra note 7, at 316-
17 (discussing importance of genetic testing).
259. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1067 n.20. "Double footling breach" is the presentation
of the fetus in the uterus "when ... both ... legs are extended below the level of the buttocks."
ATToRNEY'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY P70 (1997).
260. See Haskell, supra note 38, at E1093.
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be inappropriate for some patients; 261 (3) D&X requires daily office
visits over a three day period with the procedure accomplished on the
third day;262 and (4) D&X involves a health risk caused by the internal
rotation of the fetus while in the uterus. 263 Concerns over these risks are
valid, but, they do not constitute the typical argument against D&X.
Instead, proponents of the ban typically focus on moral issues and
conclude that there are always alternative procedures to D&X.
The existence of alternative abortion procedures, however, does not
resolve the issue. Other available abortion methods must still provide
safe alternatives to D&X; failure to do so creates an undue burden on
women's right to choose abortion. 265  Because D&X is typically used
from weeks twenty to twenty-four LMP, the available alternatives are
D&E, induction, hysterectomy, and hysterotomy. 266
These options, however, are not always optimal. For example, D&E
is more difficult to perform at this stage because of the advanced growth
of the fetus. 267 The orientation of the fetus, with the spine to cervix, and
the toughness of fetal tissues make it more difficult for doctors to
dismember the fetus, resulting in increased operating time and increased
risk.26 8 Some doctors choose to administer a chemical into the amniotic
cavity that will ease this problem, but the mother still faces risks. 269
The possibility of these risks causes some physicians to choose
induction over D&E.
261. See id. Dr. Haskell included in this category women with previous Caesarian section
over 22 weeks, obese patients, twin pregnancy over 21 weeks, and patients over 26 weeks as in-
eligible for D&X. See id. at E1092.
262. See Cook, supra note 8, at 67. But see Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1070 (stating that evi-
dence shows the visits on days one and two take less than an hour, and on day three, total time is
less than two hours); supra note 38 (discussing dilation methods used by Dr. Hem for both suc-
tion curettage and D&E that may take more than one day).
263. See Cook, supra note 8, at 67 ("This form of intemal rotation, or version, is a technique
largely abandoned in modem obstetrics because of the unacceptable risk associated with it. These
techniques place the woman at greater risk for both immediate (bleeding) and delayed (infection)
complications."). Dr. Cook stated that induction of labor, which lasts an average of twelve hours,
is a preferred alternative. See id.
264. See supra notes 226-33 and accompanying text (setting forth common arguments in sup-
port of bans on partial-birth abortion).
265. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77 (1976); Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at
1067.
266. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1067-69.
267. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the D&E procedure).
268. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1068 n.22. "[I]n the mid to late second trimester... the
D&E is no longer the procedure of choice to perform an abortion." Id. at 1067-68.
269. See id. at 1068. The risks vary from "mild side effects-vomiting, diarrhea, and high
fever" to "severe maternal complications." Id.
270. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, II F. Supp. 2d 795, 803 (E.D. Va.
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Induction also involves substantial risks, such as maternal reaction to
the chemicals used.271 A woman may also experience labor for twelve
to thirty-six hours, 272 and because induction causes labor, the possible
complications mirror those of full term labor.273  Although the
procedure must be done in a hospital, less skilled physicians typically
perform inductions because they do not involve intricate surgical
procedures. 274 Furthermore, induction sometimes results in unintended
live birth.275  Finally, several additional circumstances exist in which
induction should not be used.27 6
The last two options, hysterectomy and hysterotomy, also involve
elevated risks, as they are high-risk surgical procedures. 277
Hysterotomy involves performing a Caesarian section before it is
medically necessary. 278 Hysterectomy is an "extreme alternative" that
removes the woman's uterus. 279
The choice of abortion method should be made by the woman and her
physician after considering which risks are more probable to affect the
woman. 280  Eliminating the D&X procedure as an option creates an
1998) ("The only safe and routinely performed alternative to D&E after approximately 15 weeks
is the induction abortion"), rev'd, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), affig by panel on reh'g, 183 F.3d
303 (4th Cir. 1998); Massie, supra note 7, at 316 ("The current alternative for abortion during the
twentieth week of a pregnancy and beyond is induction.").
271. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1068. If fluids introduced into the uterus enter maternal
circulation, there are two possible results: "amniotic fluid embolus, which is generally fatal, or
disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC), in which the clotting factors in the blood are used
up and bleeding cannot be stopped." Id. "The mortality rate from induction is twice that of
D&E." Ely, supra note 7, at 6. But see Abortion After the First Trimester, supra note 33 (citing
recent data showing comparable mortality rates).
272. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1068.
273. See id. Complications are "fear, lack of control, mild to severe abdominal pain, nausea,
and diarrhea, and extreme discomfort, over a lengthy period of time." Id.
274. See id.
275. See supra note 67 (discussing unintentional live births resulting from inductions).
276. Induction "cannot be performed on women who have an active pelvic infection, or who
are carrying dead fetuses, and probably should not be performed on women who had previously
had Caesarian sections, given the possibility of rupturing the uterine scar." Voinovich, 911 F.
Supp. at 1068.
277. See id.
278. The hysterotomy "is potentially more dangerous because the uterus is thicker than it is at
the end of term, and the incision causes more bleeding and may make future pregnancies more
difficult." Id.
279. See id.
280. See Massie, supra note 7, at 365. "[A] woman choosing abortion must be entitled in
every instance to the technique that she and her physician think is optimal for the preservation of
her health interests, reading 'health' broadly to include her psychological and emotional well-
being, as well as her physical condition." Id.
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undue burden to the woman's right to an abortion. 281 When faced with
alternatives that pose greater risks to the mother's health, she may be
forced to choose a riskier procedure or even opt out of an abortion
altogether. 282 If a woman opts out of an abortion because the available
alternatives are too risky, the prohibition of D&X effectively acted as a
"substantial obstacle" to her right to choose abortion. 283  Only the
woman and her doctor should evaluate these risks.
3. A Ban Serves as a Substantial Obstacle
Supporters of partial-birth abortion bans believe that because D&X is
not a widespread procedure, prohibiting it will not be a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice of abortion. 284  This conclusion is flawed
because it misapplies Planned Parenthood v. Casey.285
The Supreme Court in Casey defined undue burden as occurring
when "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it
will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion." 286  With this definition, the Court reviewed the
281. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1070. If the ban of D&X forces women to "use riskier
and more deleterious abortion procedures, the ban could have the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of women seeking pre-viability abortions, which would be an undue burden
and thus unconstitutional under Casey." Id.
282. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how the imposed bans may force women to choose
riskier abortion procedures); see also Lezzer, supra note 7, at 360.
283. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1156). According to the
dissent, "[tihe right of abortion is unduly burdened by any law that endangers the woman's
health." Id.
284. See id. at 861. But see Rivenburg, supra note 30, at E-1 (citing statistics that estimate
several thousand partial-birth abortions performed annually); Sontag, supra note 237, at Al
(stating that statistics reflecting use of D&X procedure are underestimated). One doctor who
supports the ban questioned, "why ever do a partial birth abortion?" Cook, supra note 8, at 67.
Answer: there must be some valid benefits to using the procedure if the statistics that show its use
are valid. See supra notes 252-259 and accompanying text (listing noted benefits of D&X).
Other arguments supporting the bans have compared the burden caused by laws that require
abortions be performed only by licensed physicians to the burden caused by laws that prohibit
D&X. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 873. The Supreme Court has found that the requirement of a
licensed physician is not an undue burden on abortion (even though it would make abortion im-
practical for low income people). See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974 (1997). Sup-
porters of D&X bans rely on this finding to say there is no undue burden caused by laws banning
D&X. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 873. This argument ignores the fact that the requirement of
a licensed physician was a benefit to the woman's health where partial-birth abortion bans do not
protect the health of women. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing potential risks to women if D&X
procedure is unavailable).
285. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
286. Id. at 895; see also Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 881 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). "The Casey
opinion speaks of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 'a woman,' not 'many women.'
Id.
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constitutionality of Pennsylvania's mandatory spousal notification
statute 287 and estimated that the law affected "one percent of women
seeking abortions." 288 The narrow class of women affected was women
seeking abortions who were married and chose not to tell their husbands
of the abortion.289  The court concluded that for that narrow class of
women, the spousal notification law created an undue burden. 29°
This reasoning can be applied to partial-birth abortions as well.
Partial-birth abortion laws generally affect only second term abortions,
which are uncommon. 291 Of the post-first-trimester abortions, only 1.5
percent occur after twenty weeks LMP.292 Because D&X is suggested
for abortions during twenty to twenty-six weeks LMP, the size of the
class of women affected by partial-birth abortion laws could be closely
compared to the one percent of women affected by the spousal
notification laws. 293  The class of women affected are those a doctor
believes would benefit from the procedure. 294 For these women, the
unavailability of D&X creates an undue burden to their right to choose
abortion. 295
287. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
288. Id. at 894.
289. See id. (presuming also that they do not qualify for one of the exceptions listed by the
statute).
290. See id. at 895. Other information on domestic violence showed how the impact on the
choice of abortion was significant even though only a small number of women seeking abortion
actually met the qualifications of the narrowed class. See id. at 887-92.
291. Over eighty-nine percent of abortions occur during the first trimester; six percent occur
between thirteen to fifteen weeks LMP. See Massie, supra note 7, at 317-18 (citing statistics
from 1992 survey by the Alan Guttmacher Institute). One court has found that a partial-birth
abortion law may reach the suction curettage method of abortion used primarily in the first tri-
mester. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Little Rock Family
Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1999).
292. See Abortion After the First Trimester, supra note 33.
293. Because of the lack of statistical information on the use of the D&X procedure, this is a
rough comparison.
294. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 874 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The affected set here is
women for whom a physician will think that D&X is the procedure most likely to succeed, or to
entail the least cost"), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-
1156).
295. Some opponents of partial-birth abortion bans propose that any law that puts a woman's
health at risk is an undue burden. See id. at 880 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Furthermore, when a
partial-birth abortion ban forces women "to use riskier and more deleterious abortion procedures,
the ban could have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking pre-
viability abortions, which would be an undue burden and thus unconstitutional under Casey."
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1070 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aft'd, 130
F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998).
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B. A Legislative Impossibility: Drafting a Constitutionally Permissible
Statute
Legislatures have difficulty regulating highly technical medical
procedures, such as the D&X procedure, for two reasons. First, the
terms used in the statutes are broad. 96 They encompass not only D&E
but also other accepted methods of abortion.297  Second, assuming a
definition of D&X could be agreed upon, doctors easily avoid
application of the statute.298
1. Terms of the Statutes
The typical state statute bans "partial-birth abortions."299 Partial-
birth abortion is defined as "an abortion in which the person performing
the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the
fetus and completing the delivery." 3°° Although partial-birth abortion is
not a legal term, it is widely understood to refer to the D&X
procedure. 30 1  Legislatures purposely chose these broad terms,
understanding that the legal definition differed from the medical
296. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 863. The court stated, "[blut, as is common with legisla-
tion, the price of avoiding loopholes is generality." Id.
297. See infra Part IV.B.1 (applying common statutory language of partial-birth abortion stat-
utes to various abortion methods); see also Radloff, supra note 101, at 1571-78 (suggesting that
framing the statute in terms of partial-birth infanticide is a more precise way to prohibit the D&X
procedure).
298. See infra Part IV.B.2 (describing variations of techniques in abortion methods that are
outside the scope of partial-birth abortion statutory language).
299. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/10 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1(b)
(West Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.16(2) (West Supp. 1999).
300. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-18-2-267.5; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/5 (defining par-
tial-birth abortion as "deliver[ing] a living human fetus or infant"); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
940.16(1)(b) (defining the partial-birth abortion procedure as "an abortion in which a person par-
tially vaginally delivers a living child, causes the death of the partially delivered child.., then
completes the delivery").
301. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 863; Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000); Lezzer, supra note 7, at 356; Massie, supra note 7, at
302; Andrews, supra note 7, at 521 n.1; Ely, supra note 7, at 6; Stop Congress From Criminaliz-
ing Safe Abortion Procedures, supra note 7.
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definition.30 2 They specifically aimed to avoid making technical terms
the focus in determining the scope of the statute.30 3
The imprecise language has been challenged as vague. The courts
that found that the statutory term "partial-birth abortion" and its
definition prohibited both D&X and D&E focused on the similar
medical procedures used in both.3° Supporters of the ban allege that
one difference between D&E and D&X is that fetal death occurs in
D&E completely in utero while in D&X it occurs after delivery from
the uterus. 305 Thus, if interpreted broadly, the statutes prohibit the
vaginal delivery of a living fetus or substantial portion of a living fetus
before fetal death occurs. 306 Several doctors testified that although they
did not perform D&X, they were at risk of prosecution under the
bans. 30 7  They testified that during a D&E procedure some of the
dismemberment of the fetus occurs outside the uterus, thereby violating
the statutes. 30 8 According to a broad reading of the statutes, these
physicians, who perform D&E abortions, would be subject to
prosecution under the statutes.
302. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 863. "This legal definition is an imperfect match for the
medical definition of D&X." Id.; see also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 183 F.3d
303, 304 (4th Cir. 1998) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), affg by panel on reh'g, 144 F.3d 326 (4th
Cir. 1998); see also infra Part IV.B.2 (suggesting that the use of precise medical definition would
not help the statute). The Ohio statute banning "dilation and extraction" was still found to be
broad enough to reach the D&E procedure. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130
F.3d 187, 197 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). The statute defined D&X as
"the termination of a human pregnancy by purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a
fetus to remove the brain. 'Dilation and extraction procedure' does not include either the suction
curettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of abortion." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A) (West 1997).
303. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 863; see also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore,
11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 814 (E.D. Va. 1998), rev'd, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd by panel on
reh'g, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
304. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 388-89 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart, 192
F.3d at 1148; Little Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 796 (8th Cir.
1999); Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200.
305. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1147-48 (evaluating whether this is a meaningful distinction
between D&E and D&X).
306. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/5 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-18-2-267.5 (West
Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.16(1)(b) (West Supp. 1999).
307. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1147; Gilmore, 183 F.3d at 304-05 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting);
Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 198-99.
308. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1147; Gilmore, 183 F.3d at 304 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting)
(quoting one doctor's testimony that "it is never his intent to disjoin the fetus in the woman's
uterus"). In Carhart, a physician testified that "dismemberment occurs after a part of the fetus
has been pulled through the cervix, into the vagina" and the traction created between what is out-
side and inside of the uterus is what causes the dismembering. Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1147.
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Another similar procedure required in both D&E and D&X is the
reduction of the size of the fetal skull in order to complete the abortion.
Some statutory definitions include procedures in which fetal death is
caused by removal of fetal skull contents by suction.309 Because D&E
may require this procedure, these types of statutes will also prohibit
D&E abortions. 310
Furthermore, partial-birth abortion statutes use non-medical terms
that do not correspond accurately with medically understood criteria. 311
This creates ambiguities in enforcement. 312  It has been suggested that
legislators purposefully chose emotionally charged and vague terms to
strengthen their moral and political statements. 31 3  For example, the
statutes do not define key terms such as "termination of a human
pregnancy" 314 and "substantial portion. '"315 Additionally, terms like
"living fetus" and "killing" are ambiguous because the medical criteria
of life for fetuses differs from the criteria for adults and children. 316
309. The Ohio statute defines the D&X procedure as "the termination of a human pregnancy
by purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a fetus to remove the brain." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.1(A)(5) (West 1997).
310. There is more than one technique to decompress the head. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at
199-200. Some doctors prefer to use a clamp to crush the fetal head and remove it in pieces while
others suction the contents of the skull. See id.
311. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that the term "par-
tial-birth abortion" "though widely used by lawmakers and in the popular press, has no fixed
medical or legal content"), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No.
99-1156); Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1145; Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d
795, 813-14 (E.D. Va. 1998) (referring to legislative intent to avoid technical medical description
of D&X such as provided by the AMA or ACOG), rev'd, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd by
panel on reh'g, 183 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
312. Courts that have found the statutes ambiguous have held they are unconstitutional. See
Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1146; Lit-
tle Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1999); Voinovich,
130 F.3d at 200.
313. See supra notes 296-303 and accompanying text (discussing the use of statutory terms).
314. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A). The court interpreted that term to mean the end of
the abortion procedure, not the end of human life. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199.
315. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150. The court proposed that a "substantial portion" of the
fetus must include an arm or a leg, which means that a doctor who "brings an arm or leg into the
vagina as part of the D&E procedure therefore violates the statute." Id. But see Hope Clinic, 195
F.3d at 863 (finding the statutory definition of partial-birth abortion ambiguous).
316. For adults and children, "living" is determined by measuring brain function. See
Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1148 n.8. For a fetus, however, a living fetus is one whose heart is beating
because it does not have brain waves until it is nearly full-term. See id. Thus, during an abortion
procedure, "part or all of the fetus often will still have a heartbeat, and so be 'living,' in the sense
of the word apparently intended by the legislatures, when it emerges from the uterus." Hope
Clinic, 195 F.3d at 887 (Posner, C.J., dissenting); see also Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 815 (stating
that fetal cells are still "living" when they are in the vagina because the cells "have not yet been
deprived of oxygen or blood supply.., thus, the fetus might not be said to have 'died' until after
it has left the body entirely").
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The legislatures' attempt to differentiate the procedures based on the
point at which fetal demise occurs may have been misguided, as the
time of fetal demise after either procedure varies for each D&E and
D&X. 3
17
2. Medical Variations Outside of Bans
Even if the statutes used precise medical terminology, doctors have
several options to avoid meeting the statute's criteria.3 18  The most
assured way to avoid the statutory criteria is to make sure the fetus is
dead before extracted from the uterus.319 The physician can either give
the fetus a lethal injection or cut the umbilical cord. 320  Alternatively,
any slight variation in the D&X techniques would remove the procedure
from the scope of the statutory prohibition. 32
1
V. PROPOSAL
A woman's constitutional right to choose abortion should always be
superior to the state's interest in passing laws that merely support the
moral conviction of the legislators. 322  Therefore, the Supreme Court
should find unconstitutional partial-birth abortion laws that prohibit
D&X before fetus viability. 323 The D&X procedure has demonstrable
317. See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1148.
318. Some courts suggest the four elements of D&X as described by ACOG would provide a
clear statutory definition. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 863; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1145; Gilmore,
11 F. Supp. 2d at 813-14. The elements are:
1. deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days; 2. instrumental
conversion of the fetus to a footling breech; 3. breech extraction of the body excepting
the head; and 4. partial evacuation of the intercranial contents of a living fetus to effect
vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus.
145 CONG. REC. S 12,954 (daily ed. October. 21, 1999) (ACOG Statement of Policy).
319. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1066 n.17 (S.D. Ohio
1995), affd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998).
320. See id. (noting that fetal death occurs generally eight to ten minutes after the umbilical
cord is severed). Of three physicians interviewed regarding the partial-birth abortion debates, one
said he already does the lethal injection and the other two agreed that if the bans were upheld,
they would start doing them as well. See Massie, supra note 7, at 367 (quoting Dr. Hem's state-
ment at a Senate Hearing suggesting the induction of fetal death before beginning the abortion);
Sontag, supra note 237, at Al ("Clearly, if someone's going to put me in jail, I'll do the injection
first... [blut it's unnecessary, if not risky, medically.").
321. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 863 (suggesting examples like changing the method of re-
ducing the fetal head or removing a toe to defeat the "otherwise intact" requirement); James
Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, Partial-Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion Jurispru-
dence, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 23-24 (1998) (demonstrating how variations of D&X could avoid
meeting the medical definition).
322. See supra Part IV.A. I (discussing the lack of a valid state interest in banning D&X).
323. The Supreme Court will hear the case in April, 2000. See Greenhouse, supra note 112, at
Al. A decision is expected early in the summer. See id.
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benefits to women's health. 324  The procedure should be an available
alternative for doctors to rely on if and when the patient's needs indicate
that D&X would be beneficial.
At the point of viability, the state interest in fetal life permits
prescription of D&X, provided there are adequate exceptions for
maternal life and health. 325 Because late-term abortions are more likely
to be necessary for the health of the mother than earlier abortions and
because D&X is a late-term abortion technique, it is important that the
mother's health is adequately protected after fetal viability. 326  An
adequate health exception should relieve the physician from liability for
performing a post-viability D&X abortion when necessary to protect the
life or health of the mother. The health exception should be broad
enough to allow the doctor to evaluate mental health concerns in
addition to physical health.
327
Should the Supreme Court uphold the constitutionality of the partial-
birth abortion statutes, there will be a substantial negative impact on a
woman's right to choose an abortion. At best, many doctors will be
wrongfully prosecuted for performing supposedly protected abortion
procedures and they will be subjected to an intrusive examination over
every medical technique they use in performing abortions. At worst,
women's health will suffer the consequences as rational doctors who
want to avoid the scrutiny of prosecution will shy away from
performing even protected abortion procedures.
324. See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text (discussing various benefits of the D&X
procedure in comparison to available alternatives).
325. The state's interest in protecting fetal life begins when the pregnancy begins. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992); see also Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v.
Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 210 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The State's substantial interest in potential life
must be reconciled with the woman's constitutional right to protect her own life and health."),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). In this situation, however, the only noted pre-viability state
interest was the right to make a political or moral statement. See supra notes 204-07 and accom-
panying text (discussing the impact of charged statutory language).
The exception for maternal life or health was established in Casey. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846;
see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). But see Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 871 (stating
that "[w]e do not think that the plurality in Casey meant [protection of women's life or health] as
a universal rule").
326. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 878 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("The absence of any such
[health] exceptions is particularly surprising because late-term abortions are much less likely than
the much more common first-trimester abortions to be motivated by considerations merely of
convenience rather than of urgency.").
327. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 209 (holding "that a maternal health exception must encom-
pass severe irreversible risks of mental and emotional harm").
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although it is difficult to separate moral debates from legal debates
when discussing the issue of abortion, it is necessary to do so when
considering a ban on a method of abortion. If a law limiting abortion
does not support a valid state interest or if it bans a safe abortion
procedure leaving a woman to choose between a riskier abortion or
none at all, the Supreme Court must find the law unconstitutional.
Constitutional rights are too precious to be compromised by laws only
intended to make a moral statement.
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